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by Karen Horn
2017, Scientia Militaria
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Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk are the largest disasters suffered by South Africa in its military history. Yet, despite their enormity, Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk are little understood and hardly remembered. South Africa declared war on Germany on the 6 September 1939, after a bitter internal debate, amounting to a conflict between Afrikaner nationalists and those who supported the British Empire. South Africa’s political ambivalence and disunity ran parallel to her unpreparedness for war in every important department from the lack of vital coastal defences to the miniscule size of her army and air force and complete lack of a navy. The first six months of 1941 saw the South Africans play a significant part in completely defeating the Italian colonial forces in East Africa. However, the campaign was poor preparation for what the South Africans were to encounter in the North African Desert months later. South African troops spent their time rebuilding fortifications in Egypt rather than in essential training to acclimatise this “bush war” army to harsh desert conditions. In a reluctant political decision, the unprepared South Africans were committed to Operation Crusader. The inexperienced South Africans met up with the battle hardened Afrika Korps at Sidi Rezegh on 23 November 1941 and were annihilated in the face of overwhelming odds. In revisiting this forgotten battle, it has been found, using primary and secondary sources, that the South Africans extracted an enormous price on the German armour in what may have been the true turning point of Operation Crusader. In May 1942, Rommel’s Afrika Korps sallied forth in a series of lightning moves that demonstrated the Axis grip on combined operations and managed to isolate the vital port of Tobruk commanded by an inexperienced South African, Major General H. B. Klopper. His surrender in one day is often compared to the previous siege endured under similar circumstances, where the Australians managed to hold Rommel at bay for 244 days until the siege was lifted. Klopper’s surrender of Tobruk resulted in a political crisis for Winston Churchill and for Jan Smuts, as the fiasco caused considerable tension within the Allied camp and within South Africa. On re-examination, interesting facts have emerged from the primary source material, as to the state of the Tobruk defences and of its unfortunate commander and how the United Kingdom, acting in concert with South Africa, sought to suppress the true facts. Immediate post-war memory has been shaped and distorted by sensitive political considerations that affected relations between South Africa and the United Kingdom. Thereafter, the memory of Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk was relegated first by a nationalistic Afrikaner government and then since by a democratically elected government, both of which have seen very little use in incorporating these two milestones into the national memory.
Journal for Contemporary History
The surrender of Tobruk70 years ago was a major catastrophe for the Allied war effort, considerably weakening their military position in North Africa, as well as causing political embarrassment to the leaders of South Africa and the United Kingdom. This article re-examines the circumstances surrounding and leading to the surrender of Tobruk in June 1942, in what amounted to the largest reversal of arms suffered by South Africa in its military history. By making use of primary documents and secondary sources as evidence, the article seeks a better understanding of the events that surrounded this tragedy. A brief background is given in the form of a chronological synopsis of the battles and manoeuvres leading up to the investment of Tobruk, followed by a detailed account of the offensive launched on 20 June 1942 by the Germans on the hapless defenders. The sudden and unexpected surrender of the garrison is examined and an explanationfor the rapid collapse offered, as well as considering what may have transpired had the garrison been better prepared and led.
Alamein covers the events leading up to the battle in North Africa that turned the tides of war against the Axis Powers during World War II: the Battle of Al Alamein. The first part of the book is the history of the battle. Sections include: the leaders, their weapons, the battles of Tobruk, Gazala, and finally Al Alamein. There is a section on the contribution of spies to the victory of the allies. The second half of the book is devoted to a tour of the battle sites, the memorials, and the Al Alamein Museum. 56 pages. 20 vintage black and white illustrations. 8 color illustrations. 10 maps. 6x9. All rights reserved. copyright © Cassandra Vivian 1992. ISBN: 977-5100-0\8-9.
2011, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies Vol. 14, No. 1
2013, War in History Vol. 20, No. 1
High rates of desertion and surrender during the battles in North Africa in the summer of 1942 were a major factor in Eighth Army’s poor combat performance. At the time, some suggested that these problems were symptomatic of a lack of courage or even of cowardice. There are two broad strands to the conceptualization of courage and cowardice. One focuses on the willingness of the person to fight; the other puts emphasis on how actions express an individual’s ability to cope with fear. Whichever conceptualization is used, high morale motivates the soldier to fight and shields the ordinary recruit from his fear, preventing it from overcoming him in battle. Where morale fails, the soldier is left demotivated and burdened with his terror and, therefore, and is, therefore prone to desertion or surrender. Because it is extremely difficult to maintain morale at a continuously high level in an environment governed by chance and managed by humans, all soldiers can find themselves in situations where their actions may be judged as cowardly. Alternatively, if they are properly motivated to fight and prepared by the state and military to deal with the unavoidable fear of combat, all soldiers can be labelled courageous. Accordingly, emotive terms should be avoided when attempting to describe rationally explainable outcomes. The undoubtedly negative connotations attached to cowardice in battle and the positive ones attached to courage are, therefore, arguably unhelpful in understanding Eighth Army’s performance in the summer of 1942 and the human dimension in warfare more generally.
2012, Air Power Review Vol. 15, No. 2
2013, Scientia Militaria - South African Journal of Military Studies
2014
2012, Scientia Militaria
After J. C. Smuts (1870-1950) managed to unseat J.B.M. Hertzog (1866-1942) as Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa it was clear that the country would enter the Second World War on the side of Great Britain. In spite of extensive changes and an increased budget the Union Defence Force (UDF) found itself in a state of war on 7 September 1939 with a Permanent Force of only 5400 men with limited training and antiquated equipment. While Hitler’s armies conquered Western Europe the Springboks prepared to go North and spite of trepidations about the might of Mussolini’s East African Empire the First South African Infantry Division set sail for East Africa in mid-July 1940. In 5 short months Mussolini’s East African Empire had been torn to shreds. Victorious in every major engagement, the South Africans embarked for Egypt in June 1941. Here they encountered similar logistical problems as was prevalent before they embarked for East Africa. With two divisions in the field and a third in training UDF planners had a trying time marshalling enough motorised transport to enable the Springboks to keep pace with the increased mobility that was a hallmark of desert warfare. Expecting to build on their success over the Italians the South Africans confidently went into battle but by November 1941 the Fifth South African Infantry Brigade was annihilated and the victors of East Africa badly mauled. Fighting low-moraled Italian armies in the bush and mountains of Abyssinia was quite easy, beating the Germans in the desert would be a different story altogether.
Scientia Militaria
The quantity and quality of military historical work on the participation of South Africa in the Second World War, with few exceptions, namely that of a few significant academic contributions over the last decade, lags appreciably compared to the plethora of titles offered on all aspects of the war in the buoyant international market. This article investigates and evaluates more important South African primary and secondary sources pertaining to the Union Defence Force’s participation in the Second World War, highlighting available sources and limitations in published material. Possible opportunities for further research are identified where there are areas of historiographical hiatus. Reasons are offered for what amounts to a rather threadbare South African historiography, especially when compared to the prolific historiographical output of other belligerents. The article offers a brief survey of primary sources, identifying some of the archives that have received scant attention. Then follows an analysis of secondary sources broken down into official, semi-official and general history that examines their methodological integrity and completeness with a view to identifying what historical contributions may still be made in the light of what has been produced.
World War II: The Essential Reference Guide
In this book an internationally renowned team of historians provides comprehensive coverage of all major campaigns and theaters of World War II, synthesizing the tremendous breadth and depth of source materials on this global conflict. It includes primary-source documents created by both famous leaders and average citizens. • Introductory essays examine the causes, course, and consequences of the war • A bibliography includes recently published books as well as movies and electronic media • A comprehensive chronology clarifies the order of historical events
2014, Journal of Strategic Studies
A functional conceptualisation of morale is proposed, which focuses its meaning on motivation and the willingness to act rather than mood and group dynamics. Morale, it is argued, emerges from the subtle interrelationships of the many factors known to affect military means. It can be assessed both qualitatively and quantitatively, allowing the interaction between morale and policy to be explored in a manner that facilitates insight into the strategic process. A case study from the North African campaign of World War II is presented to explore in detail the relationship between morale and the art of war – strategy.
Historia
2018, Air Power Review
In 1923, almost two decades before the formation of its Second World War Special Duties (SD) squadrons, the RAF created a 'special force' of airmen who conducted highly unorthodox small-scale operations. Like all Special Forces operations, the tactical-level actions by these airmen generated operational level and strategic effects in uncertainb, often hostile, and politically sensitive regions. Between the World Wars, these special airmen, the RAF Special Service Officers, integrated air, civil, and social actions to ensure peace and stability on the frontiers of the empire and, in the process, helped to preserve the independence of the Royal Air Force.
World War II: The Definitive Encyclopedia and Document Collection. 5 vols.
Editor (with Spencer Tucker), author of 101 short articles, sole compiler/editor, Vol. 5 (Documents Volume). Named Booklist, Editors’ Choice Top Reference Title for 2016. With more than 1,700 cross-referenced entries covering every aspect of World War II, the events and developments of the era, and myriad related subjects as well as a documents volume, this is the most comprehensive reference work available on the war. • Provides a clear understanding of the causes of World War II, reaching back to World War I and the role of the Western democracies in its origin • Examines home front developments in major countries during the war, such as race and gender relations in the United States • Recognizes the important roles played by women in the war and describes how the United States mobilized its economy and citizenry for total war • Discusses the Holocaust and establishes responsibility for this genocide • Details the changing attitudes toward the war as expressed in film and literature
During the First World War (WWI), the Maharaja of Nepal declared that ‘the whole military resources of Nepal are at His Majesty’s disposal, we shall be proud to be of any service, however little it may be.’ Almost two million Gurkhas’ have fought for Britain. Twenty years later another serious crisis occurred, which saw Gurkhas’ fight in greater numbers than in any other previous campaign in their history. However, the question remained; how can the once renowned imperial soldiers of empire, successfully maintain the Gurkha reputation of a brave, loyal and formidable fighting force of the British Raj, in Second World War? The post WWI legislation primarily assigned the Indian Army, only for ‘the defence of India against external aggression and the maintenance of internal peace and tranquillity.’ As suggested by this legislation, Gurkhas’ remained extremely active for two primary tasks of the Indian Army; firstly, as an imperial defence, and secondly as an internal security force. Many historians claim that fighting in the North West Frontier (NWF) during the inter-war period proved to be a training ground for Gurkhas. However, one must investigate, to what extent, fighting irregular warfare helped in dealing with the ever-evolving methods of war. Despite the nations’ immense contribution in WWI, India was viewed as less of a priority at the start of WWII; ‘The external role of the Indian Army during the ‘phoney war’ was limited to providing a few brigades of reinforcements in Egypt and Malaya’ , as an imperial reserve. Instead, London ordered the GHQ India (General Headquarter India) to continue to its inter-war role, as a primary task. Research has shown that many GHQ senior commanders had traditionalist views regarding the modernisation of the Indian army. The old unenthusiastic behaviour of London coupled with a traditionalist practice resulted in the Indian Army being ill-prepared for war. Despite many years of soldiering on harsh frontiers, the Gurkhas’ mobilisation for war came later than the rest of the Indian Army. The war and mobilisation offered, an opportunity to end the old system of Indianization. However, it barely affected the Gurkha brigade, as it continued to be a unique organisation, within the imperial Indian Army. The adoption of separate policies caused many problems, to satisfy the demand of ‘Target 41’ and ‘Target 43’ expansion. Initially, Gurkhas enjoyed relative success against an inferior enemy in the Middle East; however, a series of defeats had to be faced in North Africa. Historians argue that Gurkhas were not trained for this kind of desert warfare. Additionally, senior British officers grossly underestimated the performance of Indian Army. However, the victory of 4th Division in Tunisia was a turning point that forced to re-assess the precious claim of senior commanders. As a result, Gurkhas fought other significant battles as a specialist unit, in the re-conquest and liberation of Europe. Nevertheless, the successes in the Middle East and North Africa were overshadowed, by the series of humiliating defeats in the Far East. The creation of Japanese imposed Indian National Army (INA), after the fall of Singapore supported the ‘Quit India’ movement that produced considerable strains to the Brigade of Gurkhas at a time of reformation for the Indian Army. The renewed loyalty of Gurkhas was tested critically at this juncture. Significantly, it was against the Japanese in Burma that Gurkhas showed their supreme superiority against the enemy, then in any other theatres of war. The Japanese defeat in the Second Arakan and with the successes of the Chindits operations confirmed, it soon became clear that the Japanese are not gods of the jungle. The previous criticism towards Gurkhas’ performance in the First Chindits was overshadowed by their superb performance in the Second operation. Also, the desperate Japanese offensive in 1944 had been halted, by superior fighting qualities performed by imperial soldiers (Gurkhas), which finally led to the fall of Burma to British hands. This dissertation offers the re-assessment of the Gurkhas’ performance in the Second World War (WWII), as an imperial soldier of British Raj. This research critically seeks to answer the fundamental question imposed by the research problem, set in the first paragraph of this paper’s introduction. For this task; the first chapter investigates the role of Gurkhas during the inter-war period. The second chapter seeks to examine the late, but the rapid transformation of the Gurkhas brigade during the war. The third and fourth chapters critically evaluate the performance of Gurkhas in two theatres of war; North Africa, Italy, and Burma.
2001, Chemistry-a European Journal
2021, Scientia Militaria
Operation Crusader took place in the wide context of an integrated, multi-service theatre-level offensive operation in the Western Desert and the Mediterranean from October 1941 through to January 1942. Seen through this lens, Operation Crusader was simply the Army and the Royal Air Force component of a multi-service theatre-level offensive conducted by Allied forces. The operation ended with an almost complete defeat of the Axis troops, the lifting of the seven-month siege of Tobruk and the retreat of the surviving Axis forces to a position on the border of the colonial provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, in central Libya.
2012
The formation of 6 South African Armoured Division (6 SA Armd Div), during February 1943, afforded the Union Defence Force (UDF) the chance to expand its military capabilities to that of armoured warfare. An armoured division further offered South Africa the opportunity to equip the UDF with modern fighting equipment and to master the art of combined warfare. Actual deployment in Italy differed vastly from the training which the division received in North Africa, for Italy was arguably, largely “untankable”. The Division’s first battle occurred at Celleno, on 10 June 1944, where it was able to “prove” itself by securing its first victory. As far as secondary sources are concerned, the Battle of Celleno is only superficially covered. Primary sources are however abundant, thus adding to the rich history which is available on the Division. This article analyses the Battle of Celleno, fought by 11 SA Armoured Brigade, in the context of the notion of “first battles”. Emphasis will be placed on the training received prior to deployment, the Battle of Celleno, the lessons that were learned by the division at Celleno, and the way these influenced future operations in Italy. The Division’s combined-arms approach is also evaluated, with specific emphasis on changing patterns of leadership, command, and employment of the Division after Celleno. Keywords: Union Defence Force; Italy; 6th South African Armoured Division; 11th South African Armoured Brigade; First battles; Celleno
2013, PATTON VS ROMMEL, LEGENDARY HEROES
George S.Patton and Erwin Rommel became legendary heroes in World War II. Although they came from very different backgrounds, they had many common characteristics. Both of them commanded brilliant, magnificent and impressive operations during the war. Earning high appraisal from their colleagues, they took their well deserved among the great commanders of history. About seventy years passed since the tragic deaths of both of them (the American was killed in a car accident, the German was dead in a suicide ceremony ordered by Hitler), couldn’t cast a shadow over the reputation of these two most precious Commanders of Ally and Axis forces. Patton and Rommel occupy an exceptional place in history, superior to many generals whose names are not remembered anymore, with their magnificent actions and their uniqueness. Even today, the names of George S. Patton and Erwin Rommel make the hearts of many soldiers beat faster, bring images of imposing armored units commanded by Commanders who don’t accept defense as an art of war, quickly advancing behind enemy lines and destroying them like a storm. Patton and Rommel never had a chance of meeting on battle grounds. If they did, it certainly would be a struggle of life and death, a terrifying duel. Their similar tactics, undisputable courage, bravery, cool head, offensive spirits which turn to wild attacks of same degree, complete knowledge of all aspects of modern war and of its techniques earned them very important positions in world war literature. They are from different continents. Patton’s ancestors are from Southern liberal, aristocrat families who formed the first colony in California. Patton was born both very rich and very noble. His father was a wealthy lawyer who had profitable investments in the real estate business. Because of that, during his military career and his promotions, he never made any efforts to gain the love and help of his superior officers and he did not make any sacrifices from his personality. On the other hand, Rommel was born as a member of middle class Swebian family of teacher. Because of his social status, his education and his personal interests he was left outside the distinguished Prussian school of people who commanded the army. While Patton was raising naturally fast both in his social life and his military career, Rommel was almost fighting for every promotion he got. Thus the difference in the general look of their social and military life and the sensitivity they showed in performing the responsibilities they had against their countries becomes clear. Rommel was born on November 15th 1891 in Heidenheim near the city of Ulm, while Patton was born six years, four days ago in San Gabriel, California. They both had a happy childhood despite their authoritarian fathers.(Rommel’s father was a person of despotic nature, who considered himself always right and Patton’s was a person who had some eccentric ideas of his own and who didn’t trust the government in some issues including the education)As it will be remembered, while Patton was trained to be a great commander since the beginning of his education, Rommel showed great interest in engineering, and was experiencing all sorts of work to make a living
2018, FIRST BATTLE OF DUNKIRK & BEF EVACUATION OF EUROPE
ABSTRACT | The Dunkirk Battle & Evacuation was an instant in the war (and now in military history) when modern technology came to head with old-class technology and thinking, of the past WWI. In this battle, Germany revolutionized warfare by introducing speed, large bodies of armor maneuvers, real-time radio telecommunication, focal and concentrated forward reconnaissance, unmatched planning, well-trained field commanders, high-spirit soldiers, and motivated leadership aerial bombardment in a superbly coordinated blitzkrieg. From May 9th until June 22sd, the global paramount assault on Western Europe (Battle of France) rendered Denmark, Norway, France, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland under German dominance, power, and influence until 1944-1945. The First Battle of Dunkirk, this moment shocked the Allies completely (England and France), and they will not recover for another two years, until November 1942, El Alamain, North Africa Campaign, and only after studying the German tactics and applying the lessons of 1939-1942 + American Assistance in logistics, armor ( 300 Sherman Tanks, completely equipped and fueled), and ammunition. Like in WWI, America's role in the war, was (totally) fundamental and tilted the wart balance in the Allies' favor. Approved in May 1941, the Lend-Lease Program, was an infusion of massive American strategic help & assistance (Britain, Soviet Russia, etc.), in military and civilian equipment, arms, supplies, energy, food, finance, technology transfer, and dedicated manpower, an enormous “gift”. Only with America (USA), the European Allies became victors in WWII. By 1949, The British Colonial Empire was lost. Then French Colonial Empire was lost, as well, by the fall of Indochina, Syria, Lebanon, Algeria, and Tunisia. The Second Battle of Dunkirk, occurred as from Sept. 15th, 1944, and lasted until May 9th, 1945. The German perimeter (city and port) resisted until the very end of the War in Europe. In fact, Dunkirk was the last area under German control, to surrender, two days after the V-day in Europe, May 09th, 1945.
2018, The Journal of Military History
Erwin Rommel is by any standard a mythical figure. He has been the subject of countless studies in English and German. However, the “Ital- ian side of the hill” has been largely neglected, despite the fact that the foundation of the myth around him lies in the North African campaign, where, after all, thousands of soldiers of the Italian army fought along- side the Afrika Korps. This article will provide an Italian view of the “Des- ert Fox,” using new primary material that provides insights into Italian assessments during the war. A major source is material gathered by way of eavesdropping by British intelligence on Italian officers held as POWs in Cairo and in England.
This paper expands the point of view discussed in my conference paper on the Italian logistics. Based on the current literature on the Second World War in the Mediterranean, it evaluate the efforts of Regia Marina to secure the Italian sealanes to Libya. Despite recent revaluations suggests a different perspective, my conclusion is that the Italian navy was clearly defeated by the Royal Navy in this harsh battle of naval attrition. The sources of the Italian defeat were the interwar naval policy, the poor interservice cooperation and the little coordination with the Germans. All these aspects reflected the general trends of the italian military effectiveness in the Second world war.
2020, European Review of History
In July 1940, shortly after the fall of France, Winston Churchill insisted that the British high command organise immediately, in coordination with General Charles de Gaulle, strong forces of French exiles who wanted to continue the war against Germany. The British army’s liaison mission to these Free French forces, named the ‘Spears Mission’ after its commander General Edward Spears, struggled to achieve this goal. In the Franco-British campaign to take Syria in 1941, the Free French fought not against Germans but fellow Frenchmen of the Vichy garrison. Worse still, the British were unable to provide sufficient transport or artillery to their ally. However, in 1942 the 1st Free French Brigade joined the British Eighth Army in Libya. By now the Free French were one of the best equipped forces in the desert and performed outstandingly at the defence of Bir Hakeim. How does an army integrate foreign soldiers, overcoming the differences of language, culture, training, equipment? Taking the Free French forces in the Libyan campaign as a case study, this article will examine the problems resulting from Allied units serving under British command and how they were resolved. In particular, it will examine the work of the Spears Mission which played an important role in Free French success in 1942. The liaison officers of the Spears Mission represented Free French needs and problems to the British high command, while also having responsibility for ensuring that the Free French followed British procedures and orders. Managing Franco-British military relations was a difficult task and sometimes the Mission was the victim of both sides’ frustration. Yet, this article will show that despite setbacks, or perhaps because of them, interallied military cooperation gradually improved during the 1942 Libyan campaign, which saw the first sustained large-scale deployment of Free French forces under British command.
New Zealand’s military involvement with Greek matters during the Second World War extended beyond Operations Lustre and Mercury in 1941. The Dominion was connected to the Greek military in several theatres and the armed resistance in occupied territories. This was within the context of Commonwealth and Anglo Greek relations and changing Greek political and social forces. Absent from the British and Greek decision-making circles, the New Zealand politico-military elite had to steer their country’s army through often complex, publicly controversial and sometimes violent relations with its Mediterranean ally and Commonwealth leader.
I am NOT author of this work, I am only helping those searching for true history. This post aims to be a an invitation to read the other books from the same author, David Irving. I strongly recommend to visit his website and also purchase the book if you have means - these books cost his whole adult life, family and wealth, so please contribute to him if you can: fpp.co.uk/books
Interesting reading by Evan Mawdsley
2010, Experiences, Perceptions and Perspectives from Africa and Asia
The war began on the Egyptian front with the advance of the Italian Marshall Rodolfo Graziani across the Egyptian-Libyan border on September 1940. The crossing released a series of attacks and counter-attacks and the removal of one general and the appointment ...
1995, Geojournal
Surprise is a phenomenon that can have startling effects on individuals, politics, commerce and science. The focus, however, is on military surprise, which is differentiated from military shock. The types, causes and categories of military surprise are also shown, in the context of the land battle, where surprise occurs in a majority of tactical actions, progressively more so at the operational level and, at the strategic level, nine out of ten wars start with surprise. It acts as a force multipler, increases the probability of success, and reduces the surpriser's casualties. Battlefield surprise is usually caused by the combatants, but can be generated by terrain and weather factors, including,inter alia, difficult terrain, direction, gradient, avalanches, earthquakes, dust, heat haze, fire, water, flooding, ice, mud, the seashore, mist, snow, wind, the sun, and weather forecasting. Analysis of 120 historical battles where environmental factors led to surprise found that in a majority of cases those factors were manmade, and many of the reminder were in any event planned for and exploited by military commanders. Antidotes to military surprise are briefly considered.
This book is the first of a kind in that it covers South Africa's war in East and North Africa in a single volume. However, it is by no means a complete history. Some events, especially those which involve the South Africans, are dealt with in detail, while other facets of the desert war receive less attention. The Union Defence Force in the Second World War made tremendous sacrifices, all but forgotten in South Africa and Britain. Britain owes a debt to the South Africans who voluntarily came to her aid during her darkest hours. Modern day South Africans, who enjoy the fruits of a democratic country, should not forget that black and white South Africans soldiers took up arms and fought side by side against fascist tyranny in the hope that a better and freer South Africa would emerge as a result of their sacrifices.
Drawing together a wide variety of primary source documents from across the United States, Europe, and Asia, this book illuminates the events and experiences of World War II―the most devastating war in human history. • A chronology lists all major events of World War II • A bibliography provides an up-do-date selection of basic books, Internet sources, and movies and television series on World War II • A glossary defines key World War II terms and phrases • Extensive commentary, contextual information, and guiding questions accompany each document
This is a chapter for a book published by the US Army University Press on military deception. Operation Kreml was a German Army plan to deceive the Soviet high command into believing that the renewed summer offensive in 1942 would be directed against Moscow (and not further south towards the Caucasus, the real target).
The purpose of this article is to present the most spectacular sabotage of the SOE in occupied Greece, the demolition of the Gorgopotamos bridge. Furthermore, it evaluates its strategic effectiveness, aspiring to offer precious glimpses on the military history of the Greek resistance.
The campaign fought by predominantly British Commonwealth forces in North Africa during the Second World War, in many respects, represented a final example of imperial solidarity and unity. Whilst the United States participated during the final stages prior to the surrender of Axis forces in May 1943, it was Britain and its Empire that provided most of the resources and manpower and contested most of the battles. Canada, however, played only a relatively minor part and this paper seeks to examine the associated decision-making process that took place in London and Ottawa and discuss the tensions that arose.
The Journal of Modern African Studies
This is an account of the early life of a widely regarded hero of resistance in South Africa who constantly betrayed the absurdity, the hypocrisy, and the staggering human frailty of the modern leader. In later years Potlako Kitchener Leballo also gained renown as a mesmerising orator who lived to dramatise, to command the centre of attention, to captivate listeners with impassioned stories. Having grown up in a world of oral culture it is not surprising that he expressed himself best in the spoken rather than the written word. Leballo's autobiographical sketches, which have been recorded piecemeal by numerous authors, are festooned with exaggerations, illusions, and ambiguities. However, he was an intelligent fabricator of information, with a talent for fitting a story into its appropriate context. This alone makes him an exciting subject for a biography, since the reconstruction of his life and its links to the social structure provide stiff tests for the sleuthing and analyti...
The defeat of italy’s forces in North Africa over the winter of 1940/41 threatened Germany's 'Fortress Europe'. For his own security, Hitler felt that he had no option but to intervene on behalf of his ally. By the middle of February 1941, the first contingent of German support had reached Tripoli. It was not very large - in fact, it consisted of one general and two staff officers; but the general was a man called Rommel. As the commanding officer of the 'Ghost' Division in France, Major-General Erwin Rommel had won a reputation as a brilliant commander. His orders were to stabilize the situation. Rommel's force initially included only the Fifth Light Division. For the moment, he was simply expected to stiffen Italian resistance.