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1991, Southern California Law Review
The practice of taxing church property while exempting other nonprofit groups appears to violate the “no special burden” principle of the free exercise clause. The Supreme Court case of Walz v. Commission charted a course between the free exercise and establishment clause. The Court argued from neutrality, separatism, and history to state that tax exemption of church property is part of an unbroken national tradition. However, the Court’s neutrality argument does not address constitutionality, its separatism argument is contrived, and historically, only established religions have been exempt from taxation. Past tax exemptions are rooted in two traditions: the common law adopted from England that granted exemptions to established churches, and the equity law tradition that granted exemptions to all churches. The common law tradition was restricted to certain types of church property of established churches, and the exemptions could be put on hold during times of emergency. The equity tradition gave churches another chance; ecclesiastical and charitable organizations could be tax exempt. These traditions continued uninterrupted in the early American republic. Three provisions ultimately provided ground for a challenge to the tax exemption of church property. The disestablishment of religion undercut the authority of officials to prefer one religion over the other. The truncation of the equity tradition removed the equitable privileges given to charities. Finally, equal and uniform taxation was considered a basis of American life. In modern theory, churches are seen as beneficial to society because they promote public morality, charity, and education. The law of equity is now based in statutory schemes or state constitutions, but the religious use of property is key to its tax exempt status. In the future, courts must find a via media between the eradication of exemptions and blanket endorsements.
Notre Dame Law Review Reflection
Is Tax Law Different? Unconstitutional Conditions, Religious Organizations, and Taxation2023 •
In common with other charities, religious organizations enjoy significant benefits under federal tax law, including exemption from income tax and the ability of donors to deduct their contributions for income, gift, and estate tax purposes. But these benefits are not costless. Also in common with other charities, religious organizations are prohibited from providing private inurement and private benefit, engaging in a significant amount of lobbying, intervening in political campaigns, promoting illegality, or acting contrary to fundamental public policy. The IRS takes the position that these limitations apply with equal force to all tax-exempt charities, including religious organizations. Some \= religious organizations have challenged the application of the lobbying, political campaign intervention, illegality, and fundamental public policy limitations on religious liberty grounds, invoking the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the First Amendment and, more recently, the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). To date, however, federal courts have rejected these challenges, concluding that they are permissible conditions on the tax benefits enjoyed by religious organizations. This essay reconsiders this conclusion and the arguments in support of it. One such argument is that tax law is somehow different from other legal contexts for purposes of applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to religious organization. The consistent refusal of the courts to allow free-exercise-of-religion-based exemptions from generally applicable federal tax laws suggests this may be the case. This difference could be viewed as a strand of the increasingly disfavored view sometimes referred to as “tax exceptionalism.” But I argue that this difference instead fits within the more traditional compelling governmental interest and least restrictive means analysis codified in RFRA and that arguably applied in the Free Exercise of Religion Clause context before the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith. More specifically, tax law is different because of its complex rules applicable to all individuals and entities relating to expenditures for lobbying, political campaign intervention, and illegal activity. The complexity of these rules, and the risk that granting exemptions from them for any reason would undermine their uniform and consistent application, support the conclusion that the government has a compelling interest in not allowing exemptions, and that the existing limitations imposed on tax-exempt charities, including religious organizations, are the least restrictive means to do so. As a result, constitutional and RFRA free exercise of religion rights do not require exemptions for religious organizations from these existing limitations even when such organizations are motivated by their religious beliefs to engage in the limited activities. Furthermore, while this argument does not apply to the contrary to fundamental public policy limitation, the Supreme Court has correctly concluded that in the instances where there is a fundamental public policy, ensuring that tax-supported charities do not undermine that policy is also a compelling governmental interest and prohibiting them from doing so is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.
In a democracy characterized by the separation of church and state, what role does the federal government play in regulating the activities and the financial transactions of churches and other religious nonprofit organizations? What are the current federal requirements regarding tax exemption for churches, tax deductibility of donations to churches, and political activity by churches, and are these requirements justified? Rather than interfering with the free exercise of religion, does the federal government actually come closer to violating the establishment clause of the First Amendment by providing inappropriate tax benefits to churches and clergy? This paper discusses tax laws and federal court decisions relating to these and other issues.
Philosophy and Public Affairs
Against the Political Use of Religious Exemptions2019 •
Many religious freedom laws provide exemptions to persons who refuse to comply with certain laws on religious grounds. But these exemptions are increasingly used (by claimants and others) to advance political goals. For example, religious freedom lawsuits helped to undermine the Affordable Care Act's guarantee of coverage for contraceptives. And the recent Masterpiece Cakeshop case was part of a broader effort to protest the right to same-sex marriage. This paper argues that the state should not grant religious exemptions when they are used to advance political goals. A religious exemption creates a legal inequality between citizens that can only be justified if the protection is not used politically. As such, the state should ensure that laws providing religious exemptions are written, interpreted, and enforced so as to prevent their political misuse.
2010 •
Balancing the autonomy of religious organizations against regulatory laws remains both a difficult and hotly contested issue. It is helpful to survey labor, property, tax, and education laws to illustrate the tensions between religion and government in American law. Labor law cases show the autonomy of religious organizations concerning governmental regulations through the National Labor Relations Act and Title VII. In regard to church property, the government has an interest in regulating how religious organizations buy and sell land, run day care centers and food kitchens, raise and borrow money, commit torts, and enter into contracts. Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code provides tax-exempt status for churches, integrated auxiliaries of churches, and charitable organizations. The IRS has promulgated numerous factors to distinguish among these three organizations. Although parents have the right to send their children to religious schools, the assistance they can obtain from the state to effectuate that choice is limited. The Supreme Court has decided a number of cases involving both the extent of religious symbolism and accommodation in public schools and the extent of aid to religious schools. These cases and laws show that although American law zealously guards the autonomy of religious organizations, it does not grant those organizations the right to be a law unto themselves.
This paper examines how religious exemptions harm individuals both physically and spiritually with particular emphasis on Christian Science.
Oxford Journal of Law and Religion
How Should Claims For Religious Exemptions Be Weighed?2017 •
Many philosophers and jurists believe that individuals should sometimes be granted religiously-grounded exemptions from laws or rules. To determine whether an exemption is merited in a particular case, the religious claim must be weighed against the countervailing values that favour the uniform application of the law or rule. This paper develops and applies a framework for assessing the weight of religious claims to exemption, across two dimensions. First, the importance of the burdened religious practice, which is determined by its level of obligatoriness and centrality, according to the beliefs of the individual claimant. Second, the extent of the burden on the practice, which depends on the cost the individual bears if she both undertakes the religious practice and obeys the law or rule, where costs are assessed using an impartial account of individual interests. Exemptions should be granted when claims are weighty on either of these dimensions and the countervailing value is relatively weak. The final section of the paper responds to an important objection to this approach, which concerns administrability.
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy
What is Caesar's, What is God's: Fundamental Public Policy for Churches2021 •
Bob Jones University v. United States is both a highly debated Supreme Court decision and a rarely applied one. Its recognition of a contrary to fundamental public policy doctrine that could cause an otherwise tax-exempt organization to lose its favorable federal tax status remains highly controversial, although the Court has shown no inclination to revisit the case and Congress has shown no desire to change the underlying statutes to alter the case’s result. That lack of action may be in part because the IRS applies the decision in relatively rare and narrow circumstances. The mention of the decision during oral argument in Obergefell v. Hodges raised the specter of more vigorous and broader application of the doctrine, however. It renewed debate about what public policies other than racial discrimination in education might qualify and fundamental and also whether and to what extent the doctrine should apply to churches, as opposed to the religious schools involved in the original case. The IRS has taken the position that churches are no different than any other tax-exempt organizations in this context, although it has only denied or revoked the tax-exempt status of a handful of churches based on this doctrine. The emergence of the Bob Jones University decision in the Obergefell oral argument, along with developments over the past several decades both with respect to the legal status of churches and what arguably could be considered fundamental policy, render consideration of these issues particularly timely. This Article therefore explores whether there are emerging conflicts between a significant number of churches and what could be considered fundamental public policy, not only with respect to sexual orientation discrimination but also with respect to sex discrimination, sanctuary churches, and other areas. Finding that there are several current or likely future such conflicts, it then explores whether there are philosophical and legal grounds for treating churches differently from other tax-exempt organizations for purposes of applying the contrary to fundamental policy doctrine and the related illegality doctrine. Drawing on both the longstanding concept of “sphere sovereignty” and emerging work in the area of First Amendment institutions, the Article concludes that churches should not be subject to the former doctrine while still being subject to loss of their tax benefits if they engage in or encourage significant criminal illegal activity. The Article then concludes by applying this conclusion to the identified areas of current or likely future conflict to demonstrate how the IRS and the courts should apply the Bob Jones University decision to churches.
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