Philosophy Of Language

Both Millikan's brand of naturalistic analytic philosophy and Husserlian phenomenology have held on to teleological notions, despite their being out of favor in mainstream Western philosophy for most of the twentieth century. Both traditions have recognized the need for teleology in order to adequately account for intentionality, the need to adequately account for intentionality in order to adequately account for meaning, and the need for an adequate theory of meaning in order to precisely and consistently describe the world and life. The stark differences between their accounts of these fundamental concepts stem from radically different conceptions of the world, the natural and life. I argue that Millikan's teleosemantic approach relies on a teleology of determination by means of the lawfulness of nature that leaves no room for the freedom of self-determination, for reason, or for experience-for the reality of lived human life. In contrast to Millikan's account, Husserl's transcendental phenomenology situates teleology as a function of reason and first-personal experience, part of an extended account of intentionality and meaning according to which the full range of our making sense of the world is conceived as a rational activity that is itself a part of that world, and not an unnatural activity to be separated from it. While Husserl's account of these issues is indeed symptomatic of what Millikan calls "meaning rationalism," I argue that it is immune to the sorts of problems she claims will plague any such account, since these problems arise only against the background of a set of presuppositions about intentionality (representationalism, the "mythiness" of all givens) that Husserl does not share. Husserl's position can itself be understood to be within the bounds of a suitably liberal conception of naturalism, and interpreting him in this way it has the added benefit--contra Millikan--of not divorcing teleology from reason, the latter construed as our first-personal striving to make sense of the world as we experience it--of life.

The main concern of the present thesis is ‘language’ in Heidegger. Beginning with a discussion of the place of the Heideggerian thought within the context of the history of philosophy, which at that time witnessed a shift which is called ‘linguistic turn’, the question ‘What is language?’ is scrutinized to show the dilemma which arises from the fact that this question itself is in language. After, from the Heideggerian perspective, the interrogation of the whatness of language is shown to be inadequate, requiring a reformulation of the question as ‘What is the essence of language?’ Under the light of this question, through an elaborate reading of Being and Time from Heidegger’s early period and On the Way to Language from his late period, it is demonstrated that the early Heidegger takes the issue of language on the basis of Dasein’s existential structure, whereas the later Heidegger elevates ‘language’ and takes language qua language, thereby putting ‘language’ itself at the position of the speaker and concludes that ‘language speaks’. The turning in the thought of Heidegger is further investigated and it is shown that this turning is not a change in his thought but a shift of emphasis. At the same time, it is also shown that Heidegger’s own performative language cannot be separated from his 'conception' of 'language’, which yields the conclusion that the shift of focus in Heidegger’s thought is a making of another way to language, and by this very reason, is a ‘turn’ in his thought.

In this paper I discuss in a critical manner what I believe to be some of the more interesting contributions of Anthony Steinbock’s book Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl. I will thus refer mainly to his clarification of the constitution of familiar and alien objects or states of affairs through appropriation and transgression. In connection with this I will try to put forward some of the advantages and implications of a phenomenological approach to the problem of historicity in terms of generativity.  However, I will also discuss some of the limitations and problems of Steinbock’s approach. I believe that most if not all of these problems are related to his understanding of the relationship between static, genetic and generative phenomenological methods. Therefore I will devote some lines to discuss this issue and to rethink some of Steinbock’s main theses under the light of another way of understanding the relationship between these methods as well as the task of the philosophical inquiry proposed by phenomenology.

The thesis is an investigation into the logical pluralism debate, aiming to understand how the philosophical commitments sustaining each side to the debate connects to more general issues connected to the foundations of logic. My investigation centers on the following three notions: (1) Epistemic justification, (2) The metaphysical "ground" for logical truth, and (3) Normativity. Chapter 1 traces the monistic and pluralistic conception of logic back to its philosophical/mathematical roots, which we find in the writings of Rudolf Carnap and Gottlob Frege. I argue that logical pluralism - in its more plausible, epistemic (rather than ontic) form - was enabled by the semantic shift which Carnap seems to have anticipated and that, from a conventionalist perspective, his 'Principle of Tolerance' follows as a consequence of that shift. Chapter 2 concerns the issues ensuing from Willard V. O Quine’s critique of Carnap's conventionalism, which had a devastating effect for his foundationalist project. The aim is in particular to address the issue of meaning-variance, a crucial assumption for the conventionalist approach to pluralism. In chapter 3, I present another framework for pluralism, due to Stewart Shapiro’s [2014] ‘modelling’ conception of logic, according which logic is conceived as a mathematical model of natural language. Shapiro argues that our concept of logical consequence is vague and in need of a sharpening to attain a fixed meaning. Pluralism follows from there being two or more equally "correct" such sharpenings; i.e., relative to our theoretical aims. I argue that the modelling-conception is the best way to approach a justification of basic logical laws. However, since that conception also grounds Timothy Williamson’s [2017] argument for monism, I argue that the conception ultimately fails to establish logical pluralism. Since both Williamson and Shapiro take a pragmatic approach to justification, I conclude that the question of pluralism does not turn on epistemological commitments (i.e., on (1)), and suggest instead that it is a matter of (2), i.e., of one's conception of the "ground" for logical truth.

Truth pluralism, as I understand it, is the view that there is more than one property propositions can possess that makes them true when they are lucky enough to be so. In this essay, I aim to clarify pluralism by
concentrating on three questions any pluralist theory of truth must answer:
􀁸 How do we identify the properties in virtue of which propositions
are true?
􀁸 How are those properties related to truth?
􀁸 What determines which of these properties a given proposition must
have in order to be true?

This paper appears in N. Pedersen and Wright, Truth and Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

Data mining of Indus Script Corpora reveal the purpose of ceramic (stoneware) bangles (22), seals, fillets as dharma saṁjñā, 'badges of responsibility'.They are Corporate badges, with deciphered Indus Script inscriptions. Socio-cultural framework of a workshop (smithy-forge as a temple) for a cluster of Vedic villages unravels organization of artisanal-seafaring merchant society as a Corporation with ancient guilds.

The reference to an archaeological settlement of Sarasvati civilization is based on the finds of fire-altars in many sites (80% or over 2000 sites out of 2600 sites of the Indus valley civilization are on the banks of Vedic River Sarasvati), exemplified by the octagonal brick found in Binjor fire-altar (close to Anupgarh and Ganweriwala). At Anupgarh, the river forks into two channels: one flowing southwards towards Jaisalmer and another westwards towards Ganweriwala.


Binjor Indus Script seal PLUS fire-altar with octagonal brick (a signature tune of Vedic culture). See: http://bharatkalyan97.blogspot.in/2015/12/binjor-seal-with-indus-script.html 
Binjor seal with Indus Script deciphered. Binjor attests Vedic River Sarasvati as a Himalayan navigable channel en route to Persian Gulf
Locus of Binjor, near Anupgarh on Vedic River Sarasvati

There are clear intimations of precursors to corporate life in ancient Bharatam with the social organization of the samajam governed by the weltanchauung of dharma. By unambiguous allocation of socio-cultural responsibilities governing the economic activity and businesses (production and marketing) of Bharatam Janam in clusters of villages, dharma was enshrined as the inviolate principle of all cosmic phenomena manifested in material aspects of living.

There are clear indications that cororate form (sreni) was used for the business of people. One one ceramic (stoneware) bangle (m1639) such a sreni is clearly identified headed by a sreshthin, guild-master. Thus, millennia before the Roman proto-corporations, Bharatam Janam, 'metalcaster folk' had evolved a system of socio-cultural organization of commonwealths (janapadas) for conducting businesses. Assets of the sreni were deposited into the treasury of the commonwealth and were distinct from the assets of the individual members of the sreni, many of whom were artisans and seafaring merchants.
Location of Balakot, a site of Saraswvati civilization where a ceramic (stoneware) bangle with inscription was found. (Balakot 06)
See: http://www.penn.museum/sites/expedition/shell-working-at-ancient-balakot-pakistan/ Shell working at Ancient Balakot, Pakistan (Expedition, UPenn., Vol. 19, Issue 2, January, 1977)
  Balakot 06 Ceramic (stoneware) bangle with inscription

Intimations of such janapadas are seen in the way distinct badges (as corporate badges) evolved for specific functionaries. Roots of the corporate form detailed in Kautilya's Arthas'astra are to be found in the corporate identities indicated by distinct structural elements in Indus Script corpora such as ceramic (stoneware) bangles, fillets, seals -- all with inscriptions -- as Dharma saṁjñā Corporate badges. For an Economic History of Corporate form in Ancient India, see a paper by Vikramaditya S. Khanna (2005): http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=796464

It is possible to read the sã̄gāḍā°ḍī 'lathe, portable furnace' hieroglyph-multiplex as rebus: sanghar 'fortification'; jangada 'consignments on approval' The pronunciation in Gujarati is jangaḍ relatable to jangāḍiyo ‘a military guard who accompanies treasure into the treasury’ (of the commonwealth or guild)(Gujarati). Such a dharma saṁjñā 'corporate badge' may be the gold fillet with 'lathe' hieroglyph.

Gold paṭa, 'fillet'. Punctuated design on both ends. Mohenjodaro.


Executive summary: Socio-cultural framework of Vedic village clusters of Bronze Age

The workshops evidenced by circular platforms are Corporations of the Bronze Age, with the emergence of guilds of artisans with specific functions and responsibilities to promote the Corporation as a commonwealth. It was a smiths' guild at work on circular platforms of Harappa using tablets as category 'tallies' for the final shipment of package with a seal impression. each functionary in the guild had a recognizable paṭa 'badge' (Corporate badge of dharma, of responsibility assigned in a socio-cultural organization of the samajam). A Bronze Age village of Bharatam Janam or a cluster of such villages was a janapada, a Corporation of artisan guilds.

Three paṭa 'badges' are shown on the stone statue of the so-called 'priest-king' who wears a fillet on his forehead and also on hi right shoulder. A third badge is signified on his uttariyam (shawl) which is embellished with the hieroglyphs of 'trefoils' signifying tri-dhAtu 'three mineral' strands of dhā̆vaḍ 'smelter', with assigned functional responsibility.of a Potr 'purifier'.

It is suggested that many such badges were worn by artisans of a Vedic village of the Bronze Age; such badges were ceramic (stoneware) bangles.
  An "eye bead" made of gold with steatite inlay, Harappa. Fired steatite beads appear to have been extremely important to the Indus people because they were incorporated into exquisite ornaments, such as this "eye bead" made of gold with steatite inlay found in 1995 at Harappa [Harappa Phase]. https://www.harappa.com/slide/gold-disc
The central ornament worn on the forehead of the famous "priest-king" sculpture from Mohenjo-daro appears to represent an eye bead, possibly made of gold with steatite inlay in the center. https://www.harappa.com/slide/priest-king-forehead

 
The weltanchauung, 'world perception' of artisans in a Vedic village was governed by 1. dharma, assigned responsibilities and 2. the metaphor of a kole.l 'smithy-forge' as a kole.l 'temple'.
Male head probably broken from a seated sculpture. Finely braided or wavy combed hair tied into a double bun on the back of the head and a plain fillet or headband with hanging ribbons falling down the back. The upper lip is shaved and a closely cropped and combed beard lines the pronounced lower jaw.
  Male head shows the typical arrangement of the hair in a double bun, held in place by a thin fillet (badge) tied on the forehead.

Functions assigned were recognized by distribution of ceramic (stoneware) bangles worn as paṭa, 'socio-cultural honour-badges'. Such a paṭa m. ʻ slab, tablet, metal plate ʼ,was distinct from the seals and tablets.

Such a paṭa was a gold fillet with the inscribed sã̄gāḍā°ḍī 'lathe, portable furnace' hieroglyph-multiplex .

Hieroglyph: सांगड [ sāṅgaḍa ]  That member of a turner's apparatus by which the piece to be turned is confined and steadied. सांगडीस धरणें To take into linkedness or close connection with, lit. fig.Rebus 1: Sangara [fr. saŋ+gṛ1 to sing, proclaim, cp. gāyati & gīta] 1. a promise, agreement J iv.105, 111, 473; v.25, 479; sangaraŋ karoti to make a compact Vin i.247; J (Pali) Rebus 2: śã̄gaḍa 'catamaran'. Such a सांगड [ sāṅgaḍa ] is alsoa hieroglyph-multiplex, f A body formed of two or more (fruits, animals, men) linked or joined together.

Such a paṭa were two anthropomorphs of copper/bronze with spread legs of a human body. The rebus reading of the hieroglyph-multiplex (hypertext) on the badges: 1. helmsman, merchantman, (metal) suercargo, engraver, merchant, worker in wood and iron; 2. helmsman, (metal) supercargo, iron worker

Spread legs on both anthropomorphs signify कर्णक 'spread legs' rebus: 'helmsman'

Sharply defined inscriptions on each of the 22 ceramic (stoneware) bangles indicate 21 sharply assigned responsibilities within the guild for metalwork, for e.g. 21 functional allocations of responsibilitie of artisans delineated in a Vedic village:
1. iron smelting, furnace work (m1659)
2. metal casting, engraving, documenting supercargo (m1647)
3. bronze (casting)(m1646)
4. gota (laterite) (m1641)
5. Seafaring merchant, magnetite ingot workshop (m1643)
6. Smithy, forge (m1641)
7. Moltencast copper, brass (m1640)
8. Alloy metal mint, weapons, implements workshop, guild master workshop (m1639)
9. Bronze ingots, implements, magnetite ingots (m1638)
10. Metalcasting workshop (cire perdue?)(m1637)
11. Metal implements, weapons, smithy, forge (m1636)
12. Blacksmith, seafaring merchant (m1634)
13. Helman for supercargo boat, iron furnace work, metals workshop (m1633)
14. Metal casting, alloy mixing workshop (m1632)
15. dhā̆vaḍ 'smelter', supercargo of implements (m1631)
16. Magnetite ingots, furnace work, supercargo engraver (m1630)
17. Iron furnace work, metal casting of tin, helmsman supercargo of metals, bharat ‘mixed alloys’  metalworker (m1629)
18. Minerals workshop guild (h2576)
19. Magnetite ingots, smelter (h1010)
20. dhā̆vaḍ 'smelter' tri-dhAtu, '‘three minerals (H98-3516/8667-01)
21. Seafaring merchant, supercargo engraver(Blkt-6)

Wittgenstein’s Investigations proposed an egalitarian view about language games, emphasizing their plurality (“language has no downtown”). Uses of words depend on the game one is playing, and may change when playing another. Furthermore, there is no privileged game dictating the rules for the others: games are as many as purposes. This view is pluralist and egalitarian, but it says little about the connection between meaning and use, and about how a set of rules is responsible for them in practice.
Brandom’s Making It Explicit attempted a straightforward answer to these questions, by developing Wittgensteinian insights: the primacy of social practice over meanings; the idea that meaning is use; the idea of rule–following to understand participation in social practices. Nonetheless, Brandom defended a non–Wittgensteinian conception of discursive practice: language has a “downtown”, the game of “giving and asking for reasons”. This is the idea of a normative structure of language, consisting of advancing claims and drawing inferences. By means of assertions, speakers undertake “commitments” that can be challenged/defended in terms of reasons (those successfully justified can gain “entitlement”). This game is not one among many: it is indispensable to the very idea of discursive practice.
In this paper, my aim will be that of exploring the main motivations and
implications of both perspectives.

This article focuses on Aristotle's linguistic theory and practice from the perspective of his famous "semantic passage". Broadly speaking, Aristotle considers all the basic aspects of human language. Nevertheless, philosophy also owes Aristotle another 'linguistic contribution', which consists in the attribution of new terms in as many fields as he explored and there still is much to be investigated regarding Ar-istotle's own linguistic behavior in terms of his name-assigning policies. The present research method concerns: (a) The construction of a theoretical semantic background drawing on his "se-mantic passage" par excellence, where he declares the conventional character of human language, but also on his approaches to the concept of 'signify' (σημαίνω) as "to make someone's mind stand still", as well as his formulations on "ὀνοματοποιεῖν"; In the Categories he advices name-givers to create names "οἰκείως", an adverb which Aristotle often combines with forms of the verbs ἀποδίδωμι ('to define') and λέγω, so as to express that something is rendered in accordance with a certain semantic and verbal proximity of his current linguistic use. In general terms, the factors of 'human convention', 'name-assigning' and 'properly' can tell us a lot about the theoretical background that Aristotle must have stepped on when he suggested terms, either by extending the meaning of known utterances, or by coining new ones. (b) The character that could be decoded in Aristotle's processes of name-assigning. It is therefore an aim of the present research to give an-as overall as possible-account of Aristotle's onomastics, regarding the 'procedure' that he seems to have followed in exploiting conceptual and verbal affinities that he had at his disposal, as a 'tool' to investigate reality even more profoundly. 1. Εισαγωγή: ιστορική αναδρομή Ο Αριστοτέλης συνέβαλε με ιδιαίτερο τρόπο στον αρχαίο φιλοσοφικό στοχασμό για τη γλώσσα.2 Για να γίνει κατανοητή, ωστόσο, η συμβολή του αυτή, θα πρέ-1 Για μια πιο εκτεταμένη εκδοχή της έρευνας αυτής, της οποίας το αντικείμενο ήταν η πρακτική της ονοματοδοσίας από τον Αριστοτέλη βλ.

This paper examines the history and philosophy of a little-known psychological experience: depersonalization. It explores it as a phenomenal experience and as a disorder. It examines nosological debates over the condition, both past and present. It presents speculative hypotheses about phenomenal consciousness, the self and sensation.

The Structure of Iki and the Listening to the Voice of Being. Reflections
on Language between Shūzō Kuki and Martin Heidegger
This essay aims to establish the possibility of a dialogue between different
linguistic and aesthetic experiences: are Western culture and Japanese
culture able to grasp the same essence of language and of artistic
experience? Is there a profound identity, typical of every culture, that
renders a genuine dialogue between civilizations impossible? This article
will attempt to answer these basic questions by analysing Heidegger’s
essay entitled Between a Japanese and an Inquirer, contained in the collection
of writings On the Way to Language. This dialogue involves Heidegger
(the “Inquirer”) and Tomio Tezuka (the “Japanese”) and starts
with a reference to the Japanese notion of iki. The first part of this essay
is therefore dedicated to the analysis of this concept, which is described in Shūzō Kuki’s masterpiece The structure of iki. In the second part, the
article refers to Heidegger’s distinction between verbal language and
language as the “house of being”. Through investigating pivotal notions
such as hermeneutics, Lichtung, alétheia, and the “ringing of silence”
(Geläut der Stille), the final goal of the essay is to explore the possibility
of a common listening to the language of being beyond any cultural difference.
The conclusion will show how in the Japanese expression Koto
ba and in the German expression Die Sage the silent essence of the preverbal
language seems to shine almost in the same way for the “Japanese”
as for the “Inquirer”.

Il tema della libertà costituisce nel pensiero ricoeuriano un elemento sorgivo della sua riflessione, che progressivamente diventa un fiume carsico: un che di sommerso che tuttavia riemerge di tanto in tanto nella sua scrittura. Alla luce di questa idea il presente saggio intende sondare la presenza di un pensiero della libertà nell’ampio orizzonte dell’opera ricoeuriana, al fine di evidenziare alcune dinamiche proprie del pensatore francese nell’orizzonte di una riflessione sempre unitaria, anche se mai totalizzante. Il tema della libertà nella sua realizzazione personale diviene così il centro dell’argomentazione a partire dal quale si irradiano le tematiche più care a Ricoeur: dal tema del linguaggio e della metafora, a quello del tempo e della narrazione, fino a giungere alla dimensione etica, legata al tema della volontà e del male e da ultimo sfociante nella questione del riconoscimento, tra giustizia e amore. Il tentativo di questo lavoro è propriamente quello di ricercare nella dimensione della libertà quella tessitura profonda e costante che tiene insieme il vasto orizzonte delle ricerche ricoeuriane.

Alfred Tarski’s semantic conception of truth is arguably the most influential – certainly, most discussed - modern conception of truth. It has provoked many different interpretations and reactions, some thinkers celebrating it for successfully explicating the notion of truth, whereas others have argued that it is no good as a philosophical account of truth. The aim of this work is to offer a systematic and critical investigation of its nature and significance, based on the thorough explanation of its conceptual, technical as well as historical underpinnings.

The methodological strategy adopted in the thesis reflects the author’s belief that in order to evaluate the import of Tarski’s conception we need to understand what logical, mathematical and philosophical aspects it has, what role they play in his project of theoretical semantics, which of them hang in together, and which should be kept separate. Chapter 2 therefore starts with a detailed exposition of the conceptual and historical background of Tarski’s semantic conception of truth and his method of truth definition for formalized languages, situating it within his project of theoretical semantics, and Chapter 3 explains the formal machinery of Tarski’s truth definitions for increasingly more complex languages. Chapters 4 - 7 form the core of the thesis, all being concerned with the problem of significance of Tarski’s conception. Chapter 4 explains its logico-mathematical import, connecting it to the related works of Gödel and Carnap. Having explained the seminal ideas of the model-theoretic approach to semantics, Chapter 5 tackles the question to what extent Tarski’s ‘The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages’ (and related articles from the 1930s) anticipates this approach, and what elements might be missing from it. Chapter 6 then deals with the vexed question of its philosophical import and value as a theory of truth, reviewing a number of objections and arguments that purport to show that the method fails as an explanation (explication) of the ordinary notion of truth, and, in particular, that it is a confusion to think that Tarski’s truth definitions have semantic import. Finally, Chapter 7 is devoted to the question whether Tarski’s theory of truth is a robust or rather a deflationary theory of truth.

On the basis of a careful analysis, the thesis aims to substantiate the following view. [A] Tarski’s theory with its associated method of truth definition was primarily designed to serve logico-mathematical purposes. [B] It can be regarded a deflationary theory of a sort, since it completely abstracts from meta- semantical issues concerning the metaphysical or epistemological basis or status of semantic properties. Indeed, [C] this can be interpreted as its laudable feature, since by separating formal (or logico-mathematical) from meta-semantical (or foundational) aspects it usefully divides the theoretical labour to be done in the area of meaning and semantic properties in general. [D] In spite of the fact that Tarski’s conception of truth has this deflationary flavour, the formal structure of its method of truth-definition is quite neutral in that it can be interpreted and employed in several different ways, some of them deflationary, others more robust.

The paper examines ontological presuppositions and epistemological branches of Peace and Conflict Studies. It describes the narrower use of the concepts ‗ontology‘ and ‗epistemology‘ as sub-branch and branch of philosophy respectively and later focus on their meanings in the context of particular areas of inquiry. It highlights the most basic of the core field definition and distinction issues in Peace and Conflict Studies—what peace is; the nature, causes, outbreak, and dynamics of conflict; and the means for resolving conflict and building sustainable peace. It presents and offers answers to key ontological questions: what exist, in what form do they exist, what are the conditions under which they exist, what is their relationships with other things that are said to exist regarding the field of Peace and Conflict Studies. Furthermore, the paper reviews ways of knowing, understanding, explaining and justifying the ontological presuppositions. Thus it discusses the three epistemological branches of Peace and Conflict Studies proposed by Johan Galtung—empirical peace studies, critical peace studies, and constructive peace studies—and their implications for values, empirical data and theory. In light of this epistemology, the author posits that values, followed by data, take preeminence in the applied Social Sciences field of Peace and Conflict Studies.

Le Cadre Européen Commun de Référence pour les Langues (CECR) : une approche favorable à la transmission de compétences interculturelles. Analyse critique et impact dans le contexte de l’enseignement du français langue de scolarisation, au Collège Paul Suitman de Camopi, village amérindien de Guyane Française.

La tesi presenta inizialmente il pensiero di Jacques Derrida sull'animalità. Il tema affrontato è la sovranità dell'uomo sul resto dei viventi, in particolare nei riguardi della discriminazione dell'animalità. Nei capitoli a seguire si attua un'emancipazione dell'animalità e non dall'animalità come la corrente umanista voleva. Attraverso l'ontogenesi del concetto di "umanità" viene decostruito il costrutto che sorregge la soglia che divide l'uomo dagli animali, laddove essi partecipano all'animalità in maniere differenti. L'emergenza di questa composizione dei temi trattati si erge ad azione esemplare con cui Derrida, prima di morire, ha lasciato delle tracce da seguire durante il ricevimento del premio Adorno.

This study aims at providing a possible model for linguistic representation, whose structure is able to describe the effects on sign’s indeterminacy (vagueness, ambiguities) and the dynamic nature of the system. In order to display the different ways of conceiving a linguistic system, various versions of the idea of "giving an order to the structures", that build up a theory, is taken into account: the Cartesian theory of generative grammar, the non-Euclidean one of hypertext networks, the complexity in genetic epistemology and in Jean Piaget’s cognitive development theory, and finally the theory of linguistic change by the language biologist Eric Lenneberg.

Scopo di questo studio è il tentativo di ipotizzare un modello di rappresentazione linguistica, la cui struttura sia capace di descrivere gli effetti dell'indeterminatezza del segno (vaghezza, ambiguità) e la dinamicità del sistema. Per mostrare differenti possibilità di concepire astrattamente un sistema linguistico, si considerano versioni diverse del concetto di “ordine delle strutture”: il sistema cartesiano nella grammatica generativa, la geometria non euclidea nelle reti ipertestuali, la (teoria della )complessità nella teoria dello sviluppo psicogenetico di Jean Piaget e nella teoria del mutamento del biolinguista Eric Lenneberg.

Wayne Vucinic Book Prize 2007, "for the most important contribution to Russian, Eurasian, and East European studies in any discipline of the humanities or social sciences." 

Endorsement by Slavoj Zizek:

"Alexei Yurchak's Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More immediately seduced me by its very title with a profound philosophical implication that eternity is a historical category--things can be eternal for some time. The same spirit of paradox runs through the entire book--it renders in wonderful details the gradual disintegration of the Soviet system from within its ideological and cultural space, making visible all the hypocrisy and misery of this process. I consider Yurchak's book by far the best work about the late epoch of the Soviet Union--it is not just history, but a pleasure to read, a true work of art." (Slavoj Zizek, author of In Defense of Lost Causes)

Abstract:

Soviet socialism was based on paradoxes that were revealed by the peculiar experience of its collapse. To the people who lived in that system the collapse seemed both completely unexpected and completely unsurprising. At the moment of collapse it suddenly became obvious that Soviet life had always seemed simultaneously eternal and stagnating, vigorous and ailing, bleak and full of promise. Although these characteristics may appear mutually exclusive, in fact they were mutually constitutive. This book explores the paradoxes of Soviet life during the period of "late socialism" (1960s-1980s) through the eyes of the last Soviet generation.

Adam M. Croom, Ph.D., Professor and Chair of the Department of Psychology, Bethany College (acroom@bethanywv.edu)
+1,480 citations
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There are few detailed summaries of Derrida’s “Of Grammatology” on the Internet. It is a work which is notoriously difficult to read. While there are reasons for this, it leaves the student with a problem - which this article tries in some measure to solve.

Unlike other commentators, who tend to summaries Derrida’s main concepts and give an overview of what he seems to be saying, I shall try to take forward Derrida’s arguments point by point, in the order he raises them. However, it will often also be necessary to add my own comments and explanations which will, I hope, illuminate the text.

We argue for a compositional semantics grounded in a strongly typed ontology that reflects our commonsense view of the world and the way we talk about it. Assuming such a structure we show that the semantics of various natural language phenomena may become nearly trivial.

Ludwig Wittgenstein is widely known to have held the view that language has no essence (Wittgenstein 2009, § 65), i.e. that no particular language game is more constitutive of our ability to speak than others. One of the first critical discussions opposing the stance that Wittgenstein had taken, was delivered by Rush Rhees in his “Wittgenstein’s Builders” (Rhees 1959; Rhees 2006). Rhees warns us against letting the metaphor of language as a game go too far, and thus “seduce” us —which supposedly happened to Wittgenstein. Instead, he argues that apart from different particular functions that language may serve, it has to have something that secures the unity of discourse and that can be called its essence. He sees this crucial element in “discourse” or “conversation”. In his justification of such a view, Rhees advances some hints, though not developed into a thorough elaboration, which may be read in an inferentialist spirit. Displaying such features as semantic holism, propositionalism, essentialism and —as the present paper suggests —a rudimentary version of inferentialism, Rhees’ deliberations tally with Brandom’s philosophical project. Thus, the paper is intended to analyse these features as a background for Brandom’s wider conception.

Um tratado prático-teorético é fundamentalmente um tratado de filosofia social e de metafísica, na medida em que trata da filosofia prática em sua relação específica, por um lado, com uma teoria do conhecimento e da linguagem, e por outro lado, com a própria questão da teoria do social, enquanto teorização do ser social (ontologia social e epistemologia social), da intersubjetividade (teoria moral, filosofia política, antropologia e psicologia filosóficas) e dos domínios regionais de objetos de investigação (sobretudo as ciências empíricas, incluindo, além da antropologia cultural e da psicologia social, a própria lingüística e abordagens neurocientíficas da linguagem e de fenômenos mentais), em sua diferença programática entre um uso teórico e um uso prático da razão em suas tentativas de fundamentar ou justificar a crença de que as coisas são o que são, em contraposição a por que devem ser assim e não de outro modo.

Mario Barra Jover, Contraintes en sémantique lexicale 1 Mario Barra-Jover UMR 7023-CNRS/Université Paris 8 Contraintes en sémantique lexicale Je vais traiter dans cet article de la pertinence, voire de la nécessité, d'intégrer, dans toute théorie du sens, un volet comportant les connaissances qu'un locuteur donné a sur les contraintes d'emploi subies par les entrées lexicales. Il sera donc nécessaire, d'emblée, de mettre en évidence l'existence de ces contraintes ainsi que l'importance du rôle qu'elles jouent dans la délimitation des emplois potentiels des mots. Cela fait, nous serons en mesure d'analyser avec précision leur domaine d'application, ce qui nous permettra d'aborder d'un point de vue nouveau des problèmes classiques comme les significations-stimuli (Quine 1960), la contribution du sens lexical aux conditions de vérité et les emplois métaphoriques. J'aimerais que les idées exprimées dans ce qui suit soient perçues comme des suggestions pertinentes pour toute théorie sémantique et non comme des arguments en faveur ou contre l'une d'elles. Plutôt que critiquer leur contenu, je présuppose leurs résultats. 1. Pourquoi parler de contraintes Les théories sémantiques sont bâties, à ma connaissance, d'une façon que je me permets d'appeler "positive". Qu'elles soient essentialistes ou non, elles cherchent à décrire le sens d'un mot comme un objet ou comme un état de choses capable de rendre compte de toutes les occurrences de ce mot. Ceci peut être fait en accordant au sens un degré plus ou moins important de stabilité et de délimitation préalable. Mais, dans tous les cas de figure, on part de l'idée qu'un locuteur a des connaissances sur ce que le mot veut dire (ou peut vouloir dire) et que, s'il limite les emplois à une série intersubjectivement consensuelle, c'est parce que les emplois accessibles sont, d'une façon ou d'une autre, codés dans l'ensemble de ces connaissances sur le contenu du signe. Dans une optique naïve fondée sur l'appartenance (cf. Cadiot 1999, pour l'opposition entre logique d'appartenance et logique de conformité) un signe X désigne un objet appartenant à un ensemble A {a 1 , a 2 ,...a n } existant indépendamment du signe X. Par exemple, le mot eau désigne les occurrences de H 2 O. Mais il y a, bien entendu, deux situations qui demandent une explication : 1) le terme X peut être bien utilisé pour désigner un objet n'appartenant pas à dans, Langages 150 (2003), pp. 75-87.

The paper focuses on some deviations information in the scriptures either old testament or new testament of the Bible. In addition to that, scholars have long recognized that even some of the books accepted into the canon are probably forgeries. The church has agreed that the Gospels of Mark, Mathew, Luke and John were the authentic references for the Christian principles. However, Some believe that there was `Pseudonymous Writing` was occurred in these Gospels.

Se indaga el sentido de la conferencia de Sloterdijk
“Normas para el Parque humano” así como las
polémicas por ella suscitada. Se realiza un diagnóstico
de la capacidad crítica del humanismo tradicional. En el
marco del naufragio del humanismo como escuela y
utopía domesticadora humana -marco en el que
Sloterdijk reclama una revisión genético-técnica de la
humanidad- se indaga ¿qué criterios pueden
establecerse para normar las inevitables luchas por los
derechos de la crianza humana? ¿Quiénes y sobre qué
bases debieran hoy detentar el derecho a la crianza?
¿Cómo determinar quiénes son los que educan y los que
son educados? Se proponen nuevos caminos que
tienen en la mediación de la técnica su formulación
discursiva y sus orígenes en las disidencias que, desde
la propia tradición filosófica, reducían la estancia del
hombre en el mundo a su expresión leída y escrita.

Speakers live language, that is, they intuit, create, acquire, perform, speak and say, interpret, use, evaluate and, even, speak of language. Real language is the language lived by speakers. On the contrary linguists, who at the same time are speakers and linguists, study language as something manifesting in front of them. In order to study language it is necessary to determine the degree of reality of the thing called language as the reality lived and used by speakers.

사회 세계 (MSW)를 aking에 자세히 언급하기 전에 m나는 먼저 철학 (설명 심리학)과 Searle (S)와 비트 겐슈타인 (W)의 작품에서 예시로 현대 심리학 연구와의 관계에 대한 몇 가지 의견을 제공 할 것입니다, 나는 이것이 행동에 Searle 또는 어떤 해설자를 배치하는 가장 좋은 방법이라고 생각하기 때문에, 적절한 관점에서. 그것은 크게 설명 심리학의이 두 천재에 의해 PNC, TLP, PI, OC, TARW 및 기타 책의 내 리뷰를 볼 도움이 될 것입니다.

S는 TLP의 메커니즘으로 W의 선견지명 진술과 그의 후기 작업에서 그의 파괴에 대한 언급을하지 않습니다. W, S는 행동의 이러한 기계적 견해의 주요 해체자가되었다, 그리고 가장 중요한 설명 심리학자 (철학자), 하지만 W가 그를 완전히 예상하고, 크게, 다른 사람을 수행 (하지만 W, 튜링과 AI에 프라우드 풋과 코플랜드의 많은 논문과 책을 참조하십시오). S의 작품은 W보다 훨씬 쉽게 따라할 수 있으며, 일부 전문 용어가 있지만 올바른 방향으로 접근하면 대부분 극적으로 분명합니다. 자세한 내용은 W S 및 기타 책에 대한 내 리뷰를 참조하십시오.

전반적으로, MSW는 작업의 S의 반세기에서 발생하는 Wittgenstein을 통해 많은 실질적인 발전의 좋은 요약이지만, 내 보기에, W는 여전히 그가 말하는 것을 파악하면 기본 심리학에 대한 타의 추종을 불허합니다 (내 리뷰 참조). 이상적으로,  그들은 함께 읽어야한다 : S1 / S2의 운영W의 기발한 예와 함께 설명 S2 / S3의 운영에 명확한 일관된 산문과 일반화에 대한 Searle, 그의 화려한 격언. 제가 훨씬 어렸을 때, 저는 그 일을 하는 책을 쓰곤 했습니다.

현대 의 두 시스템 보기에서인간의 행동에 대한 포괄적 인 최신 프레임 워크를 원하는 사람들은 내 책을 참조 할 수 있습니다'철학의 논리적 구조, 심리학, 민d와 루드비히  비트겐슈타인과 존 Searle의언어'  2nd ed (2019). 내 글의 더 많은 관심있는 사람들은 '이야기 원숭이를 볼 수 있습니다-철학, 심리학, 과학, 종교와 운명 행성에 정치 - 기사 및 리뷰 2006-2019 3 rd 에드 (2019) 및 21st  세기 4번째  에드 (2019)  및 기타에서 자살 유토피아 망상.

The mass-count distinction is a morpho-syntactic distinction among nouns that is generally taken to reflect a semantic distinction. There are three approaches to what such a semantic distinction may consist in: an extension-based approach, an object-based approach, and a more recent grammar-based approach. The paper will pursue the grammar-based approach, on which count categories convey a notion of unity at a level of 'grammaticized individuation' to use Rothstein's (2017) term. It will argue that verbs with respect to their Davidsonian event argument position exhibit the diagnostics of mass, rather than count. This is correctly predicted by the grammar-based approach, but not object- or extension-based approaches. The paper will account for the mass diagnostics of verbs in terms of semantic selection.

Language was of no particular importance for the early transcendentalists. Hence, Fichte's treatise on language from 1795 is unique in this respect. It is however not obvious how the theory of language is related to his Wissenschaftslehre and whether it bears any transcendental significance. The present paper shows that the theory of language is an indispensable part of Fichte's project. His account of language as an intention-based form of interaction between rational subjects is systematically linked to his theory of intersubjectivity: language is a necessary condition for the possibility of the mutual acknowledgment of autonomous, self-conscious persons.

In Deutschland wie auch anderswo setzt sich das Englische als akademische Arbeitssprache immer mehr durch. Das hat Vor- und Nachteile. Um letztere geht es im folgenden. Man kann sie betreffend des Deutschen in drei Hauptgruppen einteilen: Einmal hinsichtlich des Statusverlustes (1.a), der eintritt, wenn sich diese Sprache nicht mehr produktiv weiterentwickelt, da die Termini, die neue Phänomene oder Erkenntnisse beschreiben, nur mehr im Englischen zur Verfügung stehen. Die eigene Sprache verarmt, und mit ihr die Welt, die in ihr ausgedrückt wird.
Was sonst noch verloren geht ist ein schleichender Traditionsverlust (1.b), der sich vor allem in den Geisteswissenschaften abzeichnet. Diese leben ja zumeist von der Aneignung der eigenen Tradition, die jedoch oft nur in speziellen, eigenentwickelten Semantiken authentisch abrufbar ist. Anders als in den Naturwissenschaften leben die Geisteswissenschaften von der impliziten Präsenz einer historischen Semantik, die in traditionsstiftenden Begriffen sedimentiert ist und sich daher in einer Fremdspache ohne Bedeutungsverlust kaum begreifen lässt.
Schliesslich gibt es Nachteile pragmatischer Art (2): Ein nicht-anglophoner Forscher hat ein sprachliches Handicap gegenüber native speakers, wenn es z. B. um Vorträge oder Publikationen von Texten geht, die zunehmend auf englisch stattfinden müssen. Bei sprachlichen Nuancen, auf die es oft ankommt, hat der Deutsche, der englisch schreiben muss, das Nachsehen, es sei denn, er erhöht den technischen bzw. finanziellen Aufwand, um im globalen akademischen Spiel am Ball bleiben zu können. Fair ist das allerdings nicht. 
Keywords: Sprache, Fremdsprache, Geisteswissenschaften, Philosophie