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G. Lee et al. (eds), Ancient Warfare. Cambridge Scholar Press, 2015
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War As Training, War As Spectacle: The Hippika Gymnasia From Xenophon To Arrian, by Dr. Anna Busetto, investigates the loci paralleli in the descriptions of hippika gymnasia in Xenophon’s Hipparchicus and Arrian’s Tactica. The Xenophonian echoes appearing in the Tactica show not only a generic literary influence by an admired model, but also the vitality – across centuries and cultures – of specific aspects of military training. In Arrian’s treatise, their re-enactment is mediated by the Adlocutio Hadriani, an epigraphic record of a speech by the Emperor Hadrian at Lambaesis, where he witnessed a spectacular performance by the auxiliary troops stationed there. Certain precise lexical correspondences suggest that the Tactica might be – in its “Roman part” (chap. 32, 3-44, 3) at least – a sort of literary re-working of the earlier Adlocutio.
2015, Ancient Warfare: Introducing Current Research, vol. 1 (eds. G. Lee, H. Whittaker, and G. Wrightson)
The tumultuous transition from the Late Bronze to the Early Iron Age in the Eastern Mediterranean was marked by a change in the iconography of warriors and warfare, particularly in Egypt and in the Aegean world. It is also at this time that the Helladic oared galley makes its first appearance, where it is used as an instrument of naval warfare in the first true sea battles in recorded history. This paper investigates these earliest representations of naval combat, with a special emphasis on the appearance and employment of new maritime technology and its effect on maritime operations and naval warfare. Also considered are what modes of fighting were utilized in, and what changes had to be made to adapt to, this earliest form of ship-based combat.
H. Whittaker – G. Lee – G. Wrighston (eds.), Ancient Warfare: Introducing Current Research, Cambridge 2015, 229-251
The commemoration of the war dead in ancient Greece is usually investigated on the basis of a rigid classification of both ancient documentary evidence and modern categories. Through two historical examples, different in space and time, this paper argues instead that it must be thought in the light of the fluidity and malleability which are intrinsic to the social practices of memory. Giorgia Proietti focuses on the commemoration of the war dead in Classical Athens. On the one hand, she disputes the common assumption according to which they were honored with a strictu sensu heroic cult and argues instead that they were the recipient of a canonical dead cult, though extended in a civic dimension. On the other hand, she recognizes that they were at the core of a complex web of discursive strategies, which, through time, actually represented them as ‘founding heroes’. The heroic paradigm of the war dead can therefore be grasped only in the light of the fluidity and malleability of the different means of commemoration, notably the level of cultual rituality and that of narration, images and memory. Elena Franchi advances a new interpretation of the base of a Phocian monument dedicated at Delphi in the IV or III century B.C., commemorating an archaic battle fought against the Thessalians recorded by Herodotus (8.27 ff). This base, which preserves the marks of the statues’ feet and a fragmentary dedication (Syll.3 202B), is likely to be identified with the monument mentioned by Pausanias in 10.1.10, representing the leaders and heroes of that battle. However, most of these leaders and heroes were invented by local post-Herodotean narrative traditions dating to the IV or III century B.C. Hence this monument shows both the Classical and Hellenistic-Roman attitude to reshape the collective memory of an archaic event and the permeability between different means of commemoration.
in: 'Res Militares, The Official Newsletter of the Society of Ancient Military Historians', Volume 16, Issue 1, July 2016.
From the very beginning of our species history we have waged war. Some archaeologists claim the first act of homo sapiens on the world stage was that of genocide with the systematic destruction of the Neanderthals although there is no suggestion of an organized war effort, evidence points to small scale conflict slowly driving the physically stronger Neanderthals into less favorable areas for survival as they were defeated by the homo sapiens who although weaker and less well adapted to the northern European climate could communicate and unite to gain dominance of better settlement areas. So what does explain the advent of war? Archeological evidence offers several explanations including large regional populations that increased competition; more anchored living that prevented people from moving away from conflict; social structures such as clans that provided flexible frameworks for splitting into “us” and “them”; the emergence of a distinct political elite with its own interests; trade in goods that provided something to fight over; and ecological reverses such as droughts or large-game extinction. Clearly as Stone Age societies began warfare, the next stage of warfare became collective and systemized, where large kingdoms developed and waged war for prestige and to gain land and resources including slaves. A good example of this period is that of ancient Egypt and the ancient kingdoms of the Middle East such as the Hittites. During this period armies started to develop and the king of the battle was the chariot. The chariot represented the shock element in the armies of the day. The next stage in the evolution of warfare (400BC-900AD) saw the rise of infantry as the dominant force on the battle field, well trained and disciplined infantry could deal with chariots by remaining steady in the face of a charge or opening their ranks to let the chariots through and then attacking them. This period could be termed the legionnaire age because it saw the heavy infantry of Rome come to dominate the battlefield. Infantry became better organized and drilled with heavier armor, the Greeks saw the development of the long spear and pike-like Sarissa and the devastating phalanx formations. As these factors became more common around the world, so did war. War was frequent across Anatolia by around 5,500 B.C., central Europe by 4,300 B.C., and northern China by 2,500 B.C. Ancient states encouraged more militarism along their “barbarian” boundaries and trade routes. European colonial expansion from 1500 A.D. forward generated much more war—not just resistance to colonial powers, but between peoples as they were pushed onto others’ lands, enlisted in colonial rivalries, sent out as slave raiders, or given new goods to fight over or weapons with which to fight. This explains why the indigenous peoples of later prehistory, and those indigenous peoples observed from the time of Columbus to today, have lived through much more war than their distant ancestors. No doubt the idea that it is possible to banish war from the human experience will be seen by some as a dangerously naive idea. The idea that soldiers in their roles as advisors to political leaders can play an important role in eliminating war might strike some as even more naive. Yet, who better than the soldier is in a position to assess the destructive consequences of a political policy gone awry? Who, if not the soldier, can offer an assessment of the destructive power of modern weapons seen from the perspective of actual experience? Moreover, who, if not the soldier, can more accurately assess and express the cost of war in human suffering and pain? If the soldier can be enticed to place his own experience of war within a larger historical context, then he or she, more than any other member of our society, is in a position to restrain the hand of the politician in making war.
This is a partial list of resources dealing with ancient Greek warfare (in progress).
2010
My PhD thesis on warfare in Early Greece, from the fall of the Mycenaean palaces down to the Persian Wars. This thesis was modified and published in 2013 as a book aimed at a general audience with the title "Henchmen of Ares".
Classical Athens perfected direct democracy. The plays of this ancient Greek state are still staged today. These achievements are rightly revered. Less well known is the other side of this success story. Democratic Athens completely transformed warfare and became a superpower. The Athenian armed forces were unmatched in size and professionalism. This book explores the major reasons behind this military success. It shows how democracy helped the Athenians to be better soldiers. For the first time David M. Pritchard studies, together, all four branches of the armed forces. He focuses on the background of those who fought Athens's wars and on what they thought about doing so. His book reveals the common practices that Athens used right across the armed forces and shows how Athens's pro-war culture had a big impact on civilian life. The book puts the study of Athenian democracy at war on an entirely new footing. Advance praise: 'This comprehensive book by internationally respected Australian scholar Dr Pritchard - the first such, involving a new theory about democracy and warmaking in ancient Athens - addresses the relationship between the fact of Athens' democracy and the fact of its transformational military record. Classical Athens is famous for its direct democracy and innovative culture, but less well understood is that it was its democracy that caused this military success.' Paul Cartledge, A. G. Leventis Professor (Emeritus) of Greek Culture and Senior Research Fellow, Faculty of Classics, University of Cambridge Advance praise: 'Pritchard's book gives stunning insights into Athenian democracy's attitude to war. Did the Persian Wars influence the development of Athenian democracy? Why were wars so important for the prestige of Athenian citizens? How did the Athenians finance and organise their wars? In answering these fundamental questions his book analyses brilliantly the mutual impact that Athenian democracy and war had on each other.' Claudia Tiersch, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin Advance praise: 'David Pritchard has written the definitive account of classical Athenian warfare. He offers astute analyses of the Athenian armed forces, military finance, the ideology of war, war and sport, and the relationship between warfare and democracy. His arguments are careful; his documentation is meticulous. It will be essential reading for all serious students of Athens, democracy, and warfare.' Josiah Ober, Stanford University, California Advance praise: 'A masterful, debatable and elegantly crafted analysis of the world's first democratic empire and why it was no protagonist of 'democratic peace'.' John Keane, University of Sydney and Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung
2017, Torrance, I. ed., Aeschylus and War. Comparative Perspectives on Seven against Thebes, London, Routledge
This book offers a strategic analysis of one of the most outstanding military careers in history, identifying the most pertinent strategic lessons from the campaigns of Alexander the Great. David Lonsdale argues that since the core principles of strategy are eternal, the study and analysis of historical examples have value to the modern theorist and practitioner. Furthermore, as strategy is so complex and challenging, the remarkable career of Alexander provides the ideal opportunity to understand best practice in strategy, as he achieved outstanding and continuous success across the spectrum of warfare, in a variety of circumstances and environments. This book presents the thirteen most pertinent lessons that can be learned from his campaigns, dividing them into three categories: grand strategy, military operations, and use of force. Each of these categories provides lessons pertinent to the modern strategic environment. Ultimately, however, the book argues that the dominant factor in his success was Alexander himself, and that it was his own characteristics as a strategist that allowed him to overcome the complexities of strategy and achieve his expansive goals. This book will be of great interest to students of Strategic Studies, Military History and Ancient History. David J. Lonsdale is Lecturer in Strategic Studies at the University of Hull. He is author of two previous books.
2010
Societies sometimes expand through population growth, military conquests and migrations. Why does this happen and in what way are expanding societies different from others? Examples of such episodes are many in European history and include Archaich Greece, the Germanic barbarians and modernizing Europe of the 19th and 20th centuries, to name but a few. This work is an attempt to construct a model that explains these expansions and others.
2010, G. Fagan and M. Trundle, eds., New Perspectives on Ancient Warfare, Leiden, Brill
2015, The Many Faces of War in the Ancient World
By examining the sources for Alexander's actions at the Persian Gates this paper argues that Curtius' account of events is the most accurate. In addition, this historiographical analysis provides context for why Arrian has the events and actors shifted in the ways that they do--his source Ptolemy focuses action on himself in order to emphasize his own military prowess and close connections to Alexander. To put it another way: the most interesting aspect of the battle at the Persian Gates is that Ptolemy used it to introduce himself as a legitimate successor to Alexander.
This paper analyses the record of spearheads and butt-spikes from the Hallstatt and La Tène periods and compares it with the available evidence from the Aegean. The difference between both lines of development leads to an analysis of Bronze Age spearheads and butt-spikes and this, in turn, indicates that both improvements appear in the Middle Bronze Age and continue into the Late Iron Age. It is suggested that the breaks in the typological sequence do not necessarily reflect the antique reality but instead could also be caused by archaeological filters. A diffusion of Iron Age violence culture from the Mediterranean is discussed and the long-term evolution of Central European warfare taken as evidence for its adaptation to local climatic and social specifications. The beginning of this violence culture might be sought in the Middle Bronze Age, where the specialised mêlée weapons, sword and heavy spear, appear for the first time. The similarity of weapons reflects similar conceptualisations of violence which enable fighting in closed formation.
2005, R. Strootman, 'Kings against Celts: Deliverance from barbarians as a theme in Hellenistic royal propaganda', in: Karl Enenkel and Ilja Leonard Pfeijffer eds., The Manipulative Mode: Political Propaganda in Antiquity (Leiden: Brill, 2005) 101-41.
"This article examines Greek and Macedonian political propaganda connected with the Celtic invasions of Greece and Asia Minor in the third century BCE. Because in the Greek world-view of the Hellenistic Age the Celts were seen as the ultimate subhuman, barbaric ‘others’, the Greco-Celtic wars stimulated the development of panhellenic sentiments and became a pivotal point of reference in Hellenistic royal self-presentation. Hellenistic kings presented their, usually easily-won, victories over Celtic forces as the triumph of Civilization over Chaos. Thus they were able to ‘prove’ that they were in actuality the divine Saviours (soteres) they pretended to be in their propaganda. The article traces the development of this imagery from the saving of Delphi by the Aetolians in 279 BCE, through the propaganda of Antigonus Gonatas, Pyrrhus of Epirus, Antiochus Soter, and Ptolemy Philadelphus, to the Attalids of Pergamon, whose Great Altar and related victory monuments formed the apogee of ‘Celtic propaganda’.
2014, Analecta Romana Instituti Danici, Suppl. 45.
2015
2015, University of New England, Masters Thesis, a foundational and investigative study on early Mycenaean warfare.
2007, Egyptian Stories. A British Egyptological Tribute to Alan B. Lloyd on the Occasion of his Retirement. Alter Orient und Altes Testament. Veröffentlichungen zur Kultur und Geschichte des Alten Orients und des Altes Testaments. Münster: Ugarit-Verlag, Band 347: 169-95
The paper looks at whether we might find an international 'arms trade' in the Late Bronze Age using the evidence of the Amarna Letters and similar documents, and the spread of military technologies.
Military revolutions are a normal consequence of the central role of military institutions in complex societies. They have everywhere occurred regularly, if infrequently; they are scarcely limited to Western Europe, or even to the modern world. This essay discusses recent writings on two military revolutions in the ancient world, both centered on the military horse: first, its domestication and its role in pulling war chariots; second, the transition from horse driving to horse riding in battle. The chariot revolution of the second millennium BC profoundly reshaped warfare and transformed polities all across Eurasia. The cavalry revolution of the first millennium BC proved equally transformative and far longer lasting. Despite the controversy that has come to surround the concept of military revolution, it may still be fruitfully applied to important aspects of the large-scale historical interactions between societies and their armed forces.
2013, Saber and Scroll Journal
The Eastern Roman, or Byzantine, Empire endured almost a thousand years longer than its Western Roman counterpart. Central to the longevity of the Byzantine Empire was its state intelligence gathering capabilities; but what were those capabilities and how were they organized? Answering these questions will require discussion of the challenges conducting Byzantine studies using secondary sources, literature review of English-language intelligence sources and qualitative analysis to summarize the structure and function of the Byzan-tine state intelligence apparatus. The Empire endured as long as it did due to a decentralized intelligence apparatus that could never-theless be undermined by corruption and treason.
Iron Age swords are remarkable in terms of their short length compared to their contemporaries in La Tène Britain and Continental Europe, a feature that has led to speculation that they were primarily stabbing weapons or a ceremonial object not intended for fighting. This research incorporates previously published swords with new material from a survey of Irish museum databases to examine the swords in terms of blade morphology and dimension to infer their possible use in battle. The study shows that the majority of swords from the period (c. 700 BC – c. 400 AD), both La Tène and sub-Roman, have features of stabbing weapons used for fighting on foot. This is at odds with the nature of weaponry found elsewhere in La Tène Europe, and highlights an insular development in Ireland during the period. Through two case studies, this analysis also shows that in interacting with the outside world, conscious choices may have been made when it came to importing weapons and ideas. By clarifying the suggestions made in other works about the uses of these swords, this article looks at the swords from a new dimension, one that also relates these weapons to the nature of warfare and society in Iron Age Ireland.
This thesis investigates the military equipment and tactics utilized by Carthaginian, Celtic, Celtiberian, Iberian, Italic, Greek, Libyphoenican, Numidian, and Sicilian troops that fought in the Carthaginian, Roman, and Syracusan armies in the century leading up to the First Punic war. It also specifically examines the methods by which Carthage, Rome, and Syracuse extended their respective hegemonies and the socio-political power dynamics at work within them, which appear, like the aforementioned military equipment to have been remarkably similar. It intends to illustrate that this similar extension of hegemony and socio-political power dynamics worked together with their frequent employment of similar troops, who fought with similar weapons, to create a distinct western Mediterranean military koine. Therefore, this thesis refutes the traditional Roman-centric literary narratives that promoted a sense of Roman military exceptionalism during the fourth and early third centuries BC. Indeed, the corpus of archaeological evidence examined in this work demonstrates that Roman armies, which in the years following 338 consisted of up to fifty percent allies (many of whom had served in Carthaginian and Syracusan armies since the fifth century) were fighting with remarkably similar weapons and tactics as their wider western Mediterranean contemporaries. Finally, this thesis also intends to illustrate the central role that Celtic and central and southern Italians appear to have played in the development and transmission of this remarkably similar military equipment across the western Mediterranean.
Chapter 28 from A Companion to Ancient Thrace, Edited by Julia Valeva, Emil Nankov, and Denver Graninger
The Celtic cavalry practice known as trimarkisia is only known by a quote in Pausanias (Guide for Greece 10.19.9-11). Although always mentioned when tackling Celtic warfare, little effort has been made to try to explain how it functioned and its implications, with just a passing mention to Pausanias’ quote, without further dwelling into the matter. In this paper we will outline a model to explain the trimarkisia in the wider frame of Celtic warfare, from its probable origin in the charioteer-warrior-shield bearer triad to its late reflection in Roman cavalrymen tombstones. We will take a closer look at the sources, to show that there are some more brief mentions about the trimarkisia or similar practices. The archaeological record will be brought forward as the changes in Celtic panoply can be linked to the development and growing importance of cavalry. Horsemen and infantry often fought together, as seen in Celtiberia, Gaul and Germania, and this coordination is probably related to the trimarkisia. Moreover, a late iconographic reflection can perhaps be glimpsed in some Roman auxiliary cavalrymen tombstones, where calones are depicted carrying the master’s lanceae. Last, a look at Medieval Europe can provide a mirror to explain trimarkisia, as we find a similar practice with squires that keep the reserve destriers of the knights in the rearguard or even get into the fray. The growing importance of cavalry in Celtic warfare had to do with the development of a class of aristocratic horsemen, the equites of Latin sources, which became the ruling class in the Celtic oppida of 2nd and 1st centuries BC. In this way the trimarkisia should be viewed not only as a military practice but also as an indicator of social developments in Western Europe late Iron Age.
2015, Ancient Warfare: Introducing Current Research, Vol. I, pp. 172-190
This paper analyses how the ‘Celtic’ cavalry practice known as trimarkisia gives us insight into the evolution from chariotry to cavalry in Iron Age temperate Europe. A close look at the etymology and symbolism of the word trimarkisia reveals both the importance of the triad in the ‘Celtic’ mindset and the later development of cavalry in regard to chariotry. Chariot warfare is then examined, taking into account literary sources and iconography to show how three men probably made up the chariot fighting team. Finally, a model which explains the transition from the chariot to the trimarkisia is advanced, tackling its tactical and symbolical dimensions in regard to knowledge networks in the ‘Celtic’ world.
WAR-CHARIOTS AND CHARIOTEERS OF THE ANCIENT GREEKS (16TH-1ST CENTURIES B.C.). St.Petersburg, 2001. 528 Pp. (in Russian with English summary). Contents. Prof. Dr. Alexander I. Zajcev. Preface.Dr. Valerii P. Nikonofov. Preface.Author’s preface.Introduction.1. Sources and historiography. Aims of the work.2. Brief notes on chariot.2.1. Chariot.2.2. Horse.2.3. Team of horses.2.4. Crew.2.5. Function of team.Conventional signs Chapter I. Origin and development of chariot. 1. From battle-wagon to chariot. 2. Horse: Domestication and initial uses. 3. Early stages of chariot development. Appearance of chariotry.4. Chariots, charge!4.1. Face of chariot battle: chariots versus chariots.4.2. Charioteers and footmen.4.3. Chariot patrol: chariot actions during siege and patroling.5. From chariotry to cavalry: the further development of mounted troops in the Near East (the mid-2nd - the first half of 1st millenniums BC). Chapter II. War-chariots and charioteers of Greece (the 16th-7th centuries BC). 1. Appearance of a horse in Greece.2. First Greek chariots: problem of the origin.2.1. Myth sources.2.2. Archaeology source.3. Chariotry of Mycenaean epoch.3.1. Achaean charioteers.3.2. System of charioteers’ supply.3.3. Armour of Aegean charioteers in the 15th - mid-13th centuries BC.3.4. Structure of Mycenaean epoch chariots.3.4.1. Monument information.3.4.2. Information of the linear B.3.5. Number of Achaean chariots.3.6. Use of Mycenaean chariots in the 16th-13th centuries BC.3.6.1. Opinions of the scholars.3.6.2. Tactics of Mycenaean chariots in the 16th - the mid-13th centuries BC.3.7. Late Mycenaean chariots and their use. 4. Homeric chariots: did a myth or reality is?4.1. Relation of an epos and reality.4.2. Chariot of Homerus’ «Iliad».4.3. Use of chariots in the Homeric epos: a problem of verification.4.4. Essedae in battle: tactics of Briton’s war-chariots. 4.5. Did tactics of Homerus’ chariot is typical? 5. War-chariots of Archaic Greece.5.1. Information of archaeological and iconigraphic sources.5.2. Construction of chariots on the data of Archaic vase paintings.5.3. Use of chariots according to the Greek narrative tradition. 6. Main traits of Greek warfare development in the 17th – the 7th centuries BC. Chapter III. Cyrenean chariotry. 1. Short history of chariots in the North-East Africa. 2. Cyrenean charioteers: who were they? 3. Military organisation of Cyrene. 3.1. Cyrenean lochos. 3.2. Movnippoi: horsemen or charioteers? 3.3. Lochos of quadrigae. 4. Crew of Cyrenean war-quadriga. 5. Personal Staff of Cyrenean chariotry. 6. Use of war-chariots by the inhabitants of Cyrenaica. 7. Did bowmen or javelinmen are? 8. Conclusion. Chapter IV. Scythed chariots in the Achaemenid and Hellenistic periods. 1. Antique sources on the origin of scythed chariots. 2. Modern hypothesis on the origin of scythed chariots. 3. History of scythed chariots. 3.1. Achaemenid epoch. 3.2. Seleucid scythed quadrigae. 3.3. Scythed chariot of Mithridates VI’ army. 4. Tactics of scythed quadrigae. 5. Time appearance of scythed chariot. 6. Scythed chariot: structures and armaments. 6.1. Structure of scythed chariot according to the Xenophon’s information. 6.2. Equipment of quadrigae in the late 5th - the early 4th centuries BC. 6.3. Equipment of scythed chariot of the end of the Achaemenid epoch. 6.4. Structure of scythed chariot in the Hellenistic period. 6.5. Did the scythed chariot of king Abradatas is real? 6.6. Seleucid gigantomania: Antiochus IV’ scythed sejuges. 6.7. Armour of chariot horses in the Achaemenid and Hellenistic periods. 7. Appendix. Typicalness or uniqueness: armed chariot through centuries. 7.1. Information of ancient authors on scythed chariots of different peoples in Antiquity. 7.2. Did the Celtic covina is a chariot with sickles? 7.3. Chinese chariots with axe-blades. 7.4. The projects that have never been realised: from Late Antiquity to New Age. 7.4.1. Treatise «De rebus belicis» is the beginning of transition of a chariot with sickles in theory area. 7.4.2. Epochs of Middle Age and Renaissance. 7.4.4. Projects of the 18th-19th centuries AD. 7.5. Where were real scythed chariots? 8. A place of scythed chariots in ancient military history. Chapter V. Charioteers of scythed quadrigae. 1. Status of the charioteers in the Achaemenid empire on the data of Xenophon’s «Cyropaedia». 2. Babylonian bМt narkabti is a «land of chariot». 3. Crew of scythed chariot. 4. Recruitment of charioteers. 5. System of supply. 6. Armament of charioteer. 7. Structure of a chariotry military organisation. 8. Conclusion. Conclusion. General and especial: chariot development in Greece and Near East.Chronological tables.History of Greece.Archaeological periods of Ancient Greece history.Date of ancient Greece pottery.History of ancient Egypt.History of ancient Mesopotamia.History of ancient Near East.History of ancient Persia.History of ancient Cyrene.History of ancient China.Abbreviations.Bibliography.I. Sources.1. Collections.2. Works of the Greek and Latin authors.3. Translations of Oriental sources.4. Collections of inscriptions and tablets.5. Medieval European sources.II. Literature.Index of proper names.Index of geographical names.List of illustrations.List of maps and schemes.English summary.Contents.
2007, The Hellenistic Royal Court: Court Culture, Ceremonial and Ideology in Greece, Egypt and the Near East, 336-30 BCE (PhD Dissertation: Utrecht, 2007)
The Megiddo pillared buildings had been discovered by the Oriental Institute's team in the 1920s and a short while later were identified by P.L.O. Guy as stables associated with King Solomon (1931:37-48; see also Lamon and Shipton 1939:32-47, 59). Guy based his interpretation on two biblical references: the mention of the building activity of Solomon at Megiddo in I Kgs. 9:15, and the reference to Solomonic cities for chariots and horsemen in I Kgs. 9:19. Guy's theory was widely accepted and remained the standard explanation for the function of the Megiddo pillared buildings for the next forty years. 1 This changed in the early 1970s, with the discovery of somewhat similar buildings at Tel Beer-sheba, packed with hundreds of pottery vessels in their side-aisles (Aharoni 1973:15). Consequently, Aharoni (ibid: 15-17; 1982:222-225) and Herzog (1973; 1992: 223-228), the excavators of the site, proposed that the pillared buildings of this type – at Tel Beer-sheba, Megiddo and other places – functioned as storehouses. 2 The debate became even more complicated with the introduction of two additional interpretations for the pillared buildings of the Iron Age: that they functioned as army barracks (Fritz 1977), or as market places (Herr 1988). Though the buildings at Megiddo and Tel Beer-sheba (as well as structures unearthed at other sites) are quite similar in their plan, there are marked differences between them in size, location in the city, quality of construction, etc. The Megiddo buildings are by far more monumental than all other buildings of this type. They are also unique in that they have a large courtyard in front of the southern complex, and a smaller though spacious courtyard in the space between the three sets of the northern complex (see Chapters 8 and 43). In addition, Megiddo is the only place where sets of pillared buildings cover a large portion of the area of the site. Whatever their function, the city of Stratum IVA seems to have been devoted to the function of these buildings. The Megiddo pillared buildings are therefore a unique phenomenon. As in the case of the 'four room house', the tripartite pillared building type could have been used for a variety of functions (Mazar 1990:476-478). Our goal is to deal with the Megiddo buildings only,and the following remarks do not necessarily apply to other sites where buildings of this type were uncovered. This chapter addresses the three main questions related to the Megiddo buildings: the date of their construction; their function; and the historical circumstances that brought about the transformation of Megiddo into the hub of a unilateral industry.
2009
I have always been fascinated by politics – not parties or elections, but the play of power, legitimacy, and justice. Politics, in this extended sense, is at once a practical issue, an interpretative problem, and a moral concern: understanding any given political system or regime requires describing how it actually works, explaining why it works that way, and offering defensible reasons for why it ought to be otherwise (if in fact it ought).
2019, Greek Military Service in the Ancient Near East, 401-330 BCE
Full book: https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/classical-studies/ancient-history/greek-military-service-ancient-near-east-401330-bce?format=HB
The technology and materiel of warfare changed from prehistoric times to the fall of the Roman Empire due to improvements in metallurgy and compounding ingenuity over the millennia. Despite the changes and improvements that spanned the ages from Hammurabi to Hadrian, the basic implements of warfare remained somewhat consistent. The thrusting spears used by Eanatum of Lagash in Mesopotamia c. 2500 BC and the dory used by the phalanx armies of Classical Greece at the Battle of Marathon in 490 BC served a similar purpose. The Bronze Age Naue Type II sword of c. 1200 BC and the Roman gladius of c. 200 BC were roughly the same size and had the same use. The circular or pendular way a particular type or style of weapon gained popularity in antiquity, was superseded by a new innovation, and then returned centuries or millennia later in a slightly modified form indicates that the evolution of ancient weaponry was sometimes an evolution of circumstances surrounding its use as much as the physical substance of the weapon. The evolution of ancient close-combat armaments shows both continuity and change, depending on the given set of military conditions.