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The fall of the Muslim civilization resulted from the rejection of reason. The rejection of reason was a result of the characterization of the use of reason to know revelation as kufr. The rejection of reason became explicit in the shutting of the gates to ijtihad and was reinforced by al-Ghazali’s attack on philosophers. The rejection of reason found political expression in the repression of the rationalists by Musa al-Hadi in 786. The slaughter of five-thousand philosophers was an event analogous to the Reign of Terror of the Jacobins, under Maximilien Robespierre during the French Revolution. Sixteen thousand followers of “tradition” were beheaded at the guillotine with the emergence of the Age of Reason, touted by the European Enlightenment, a millennium afterwards. In Islam, the rejection of reason made it harder to understand and follow revelation. The perception that “all knowledge is in the Quran” did not help matters. This was an example of perfunctory thought. For it automatically withheld the designation of “knowledge” from all knowledge not in the Quran. This perception was based on a problematic understanding of epistemology or what constitutes knowledge. It was a reflection of hubris. In response to the bewilderment caused the prohibition of the use of reason, exegetes alleged that revelation features “ambiguous” passages. The rejection of reason made it hard to know and follow revelation. It also made it hard to understand key terms as “mutashabihat,” “hikma,” and “hawa.” As a result, Muslims turned to tradition, which replaced reason for the purpose of explaining revelation. But to “explain” revelation, tradition had to be elevated to an “equal” of revelation and subsequently even “above” revelation. For the expectation that it would “explain” revelation placed tradition in the position of a “judge” of revelation. The elevation of tradition above revelation reversed the relation of revelation and tradition. The word of God was subordinated to the words of persons. The reversal of the relationship between revelation and tradition facilitated the adoption of the teaching of abrogation. The abrogation of the peace verses by the ayah as-sayf transformed Islam into “political Islam.” The abrogation of revelation by tradition transformed Islam into “traditional Islam.” The application of the teaching of abrogation warped penal law. The abrogation of revelation by tradition subjugated revelation to tradition. Hence, the process that led to this requires attention. It is necessary to restore revelation to its pre-eminence in relation to tradition, to rehabilitate reason, and to ensure that all laws are in agreement with revelation rather than based on inclination. (4 pages)
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"The proliferation of hadiths spawned a parallel body of law, believed to be “equal” to the law based on revelation. The prophet tried to prevent the proliferation of traditions. But people proceeded to record and disseminate them regardless. The result was a parallel system of law. This requires attention. The elevation of hadiths to revelation suggests two Lawgivers. How are we to reconcile this with the teaching of tawhid? The elevation of tradition to revelation enabled the formulation of law based upon folklore, statements that are not admissible in law courts, let alone in Islamic law, which features stringent requirements of proof. For example, conviction of adultery requires four reliable witnesses. Yet problematic jurists accepted the testimony of an under-aged person as a basis for sentencing people to death for the alleged “crime” of apostasy, when apostasy is not a transgression punishable in this life according to revelation. Among the worst developments has to be the designation of the use of reason to understand revelation as a form of kufr. This was an assault on reason by persons steeped in mysticism and anti-rationalism. It paved the way for the emergence of Islamism, the remnants of which we see to this day in the actions of ISIS and their supporters. This assault on reason foreshadowed Nietzsche’s attack on rationalism a millennium afterwards. It followed the assault on the philosophers by Musa al-Hadi in 786.The characterization of the use of reason in the comprehension of revelation as kufr shows how far exegesis and jurisprudence atrophied from the early days. It also highlights the urgency of restructuring penal law. It is no wonder that not a few persons are drifting from Islam and those who wish to remain are asking for better methodology. (24 pages)
"Different factors were identified as causing the decline of the Islamic civilization. Perhaps a suitable way to answer this question is to ask what were the factors that led to the rise of the Islamic civilization, and then to argue that the withdrawal or change in these factors caused the decline. It is clear that the Muslim civilization rose on account of following revelation. To follow revelation, one must understand it. And to apply or follow revelation one must use one’s reason. Hence, the Muslim civilization declined when people no longer followed revelation but something else, tradition. They reduced following revelation because they could not understand it. And they could not understand it because they ceased using their reason. They ceased using their reason because they identified the use of reason with kufr and wanted to follow tradition. In other words, the Muslim civilization declined because its turned form revelation and started to follow tradition: “the Sunnah was viewed as the self-sufficient guidebook to Islamic life.” To justify this turn, they declared tradition to be revelation. But tradition is not revelation. And here is the tragic flaw that brough the Islamic civilization to its knees. It began following what Allah did not reveal. Hence, what is required is a return to revelation, the subordination of tradition to revelation and the rehabilitation of reason. (19 pages)
The prohibition of reasoning produced paralysis in Muslim thought. The paralysis resulted in aberrations in exegesis. These encompass assumptions that are at variance with reason. These include the assumptions that the use of reason in the elucidation of revelation is kufr, that revelation features “unclear” verses, and that tradition is revelation. Tradition took precedence in relation to revelation on the basis of the perception that “tradition judges revelation.” This rearrangement enabled rulings based on traditions, without basis in revelation, to be embedded in jurisprudence. These encompass the death penalties for adultery, blasphemy and apostasy. Rehabilitation of reasoning thus requires a recognition of the role of reason in comprehending both tradition and revelation, reinstating revelation to pre-eminence in relation to tradition, and a desacralization of tradition. This should assist in addressing aberrations produced by the subjugation of revelation to tradition. (8 pages)
Knowledge encompasses the knowledge of revelation. In the West, knowledge was affected by empiricism. In a defiance of the traditional perspective, the partisans of empiricism asserted that “seeing is believing.” If a thing may not be seen, empiricists argue, it does not exist. As God is nowhere be seen, according to empiricism, He does not exist. This is a flimsy epistemological basis for the knowledge of revelation. For they miss the fact that while God cannot be perceived by the five senses, the evidence of His existence is perceptible everywhere. The knowledge of revelation in Islam was tainted by problematic exegeses, traditional as well as political. Traditional exegesis produced “traditional Islam” while political exegesis produced “political Islam.” Traditional exegesis asserts that traditions are “equal” to revelation, while political exegesis teaches that the religion of peace evolved into a religion of war. Tradition takes it for granted that the prophetic traditions “judge,” “abrogate” and “replace” parts of revelation. Political exegesis endorses the perception that the ayah as-sayf (Quran, 9:5) “abrogated” verses that teach reconciliation. Traditional exegesis says that we have no freedom of the will. Allah predestines all acts. Political Islam teaches that we possess the ability to be better. Traditional exegesis teaches predestination, but political exegesis teaches activism. Traditional Islam teaches resignation to fate. Political Islam pursues “reform.” Belief in determinism perpetuates the status quo. It renders Muslims passive and “satisfied” with their “fate.” Predestination is irrational. How could God condemn His servants to hell after forcing them to transgress in the first place? The teaching of fatalism is a corruption of the teaching of Islam. Thus, there are problems with both traditional and political Islam. Neither reflects the pristine teaching of the Book of Allah reliably. For to assert that traditions are “equal” to revelation is to assert that the reports of the transmitters of traditions are “equal” to the words of God. And to assert that Allah abrogates His words is to ascribe imperfection – a personal trait – to Him. Moreover, to assert that there are six “supplementary” books of revelation is to suggest that the Book of Allah is imperfect and accordingly requires being “supplemented” and “clarified” by “additional” revelations, reported by persons. It is to assert that there are six “supplementary” providers of revelation. However, no person is able to reveal anything “equal” or “similar” to what Allah revealed. He reveals true religion. In time, tradition and politics eclipsed revelation. Naql (tradition) eclipsed ‘aql (intellect). Reason would be perceived as unsuitable for understanding revelation. This was remarkable, as all understanding requires the use of reason. To prohibit the use of reason problematic. It is to pave the road for the arrival of fanaticism. That revelation presents itself as “enlightenment” did not trouble the followers of tradition. Regrettably, the belittling of reasoning and the engagement of tradition to “explain” and “supplement” revelation did not enhance the knowledge of revelation. In fact, it made it harder to know and therefore to follow revelation. For it is not possible to follow what we do not understand. And it is not possible to know anything without the use of reason. To prohibit the use of reason is to block access to the knowledge of revelation. To prohibit access to knowledge is to prevent believers from following the teachings of Allah. Instead of enabling access to the knowledge of revelation, tradition presents itself as a “trustee” of revelation. The sharia emerged from traditions rather than revelation. To make matters worse, disparagement of reasoning enabled problematic practices to corrupt exegesis and, in that way, taint the knowledge of revelation. Unwarranted assumptions encompass the perception that the use of reason to explain revelation is kufr, that revelation is “unclear,” that revelation is “incomplete,” and that tradition is revelation. An example of a problematic practice is the teaching of abrogation.
"Much has been written about Islam in politics. Not much is written, however, about politics in Islam. What is axiomatic is that ruling elites “shape” knowledge to endorse their requirements, which is usually to maintain the status quo. Hence, the prohibition of private property was a feature of egalitarianism. The legalization of usury is a feature of the acquisitive nation. Efforts to “shape” knowledge is reflected in the experience of dissidents. In so far as they feel threatened by dissenting perceptions, elites tend to enforce a uniform worldview, lest “national unity,” or the “orthodoxy” could be in jeopardy. This is characteristic of egalitarianism, secularism or Islamism. However, as the experience of prophets also shows, dissenting perceptions at times do become the norm. The past confirms this. The French revolutionaries enforced the worldview of the Enlightenment through the Reign of Terror. Stalin enforced totalitarianism through purges and gulags. In Islam, Musa al-Hadi enforced tradition by murdering 5,000 thinkers in 786. Despotism enforces its worldview. Enforcement takes place through the use of brute force. Islam is presented as a religion that had an uninterrupted evolution, thus retaining its message in an uncorrupted form. The “classical tradition” is revered and presented as “authentic.” Yet an examination supplies a different perception. For two factors affected if not altered the knowledge of Islam: tradition and politics. Fazlur Rahman differentiated between ideal and actual Islam. For practice does not always reflect theory perfectly. The latter veered from the former. Islam did not remain static. The fitnahs of Islam testify to divisions. Two transformations are perceptible, triggered by disparate events. The first took place when tradition ¬– in preference to reason – was engaged to “explain” revelation. This required the downgrading of reason and the elevation of tradition to revelation. The designation of tradition as “revelation,” together with the ramifications of this event, transformed Islam into “traditional Islam.” The second transformation took place when the ayah as-sayf allegedly “abrogated” the peace verses. The abrogation of the peace verses, a massive tampering with the teaching of revelation, together with the emergence of bellicose traditions, transformed Islam into “political Islam.” It provided the justification for expansion, a precursor of “manifest destiny,” the perceived obligation to spread the benefits of Islam around the world, as “manifest destiny” required “spreading democracy” globally. The transformation facilitated the adoption of the separation of the world into the “abode of peace” and “the abode of war,” an early variant of the “clash of civilisations.” This provided justification for the expansion of the empire. But true Islam is neither traditional nor political. It is universal. True Islam is trans-national and non-sectarian. The engagement of tradition to “supplement” and “explain” revelation, moreover, contradicted the perception that revelation was perfect, as a perfect revelation would hardly require being “supplemented,” “explained,” and “abrogated.” The application of the theory of abrogation to revelation resulted in its restructuring with adverse results for the Muslim empire. The re-interpretation was facilitated by problematic folklore and the devaluation of reasoning. The wars of expansion were embarked upon in defiance of warning in revelation that “Allah does not love aggressors.” The politicization of revelation was a reflection of tribal tendencies that tainted the knowledge of revelation. Applying a predicate to Islam transforms its meaning. Thus, Islam differs from “political Islam.” Traditional Islam was formed by parochial tendencies. To recover universal Islam, it is necessary to free it of unwarranted accretions, assumptions as well as problematic practices pandering to the aspirations of the few. (16 pages)
Anti-rationalism in Islam is responsible for backwardness, corruption of knowledge and the fall of the Muslim empire. The West went through a Reformation and the Age of Reason. Islam also had an Age of Reason. However, it was short-lived, due to a backlash by tradition. Backwardness rendered Muslims vulnerable from without. The corruption of knowledge made the umma vulnerable from within. A “holier than thou” attitude brought backwardness. The perception that all effects are produced by Allah is worrying. It leaves no room for freedom of the will. Is it just for God to punish wrongdoers for what He “predestined” them to perform? The teaching of predestination denies a significant part of the teaching of revelation. The relationship between cause and effect is an essential part of the teaching Islam. By rejecting causality, Ghazali denied a significant part of the teaching of revelation. He turned people into machines. Predestination rests on the assumption that Allah rules without regard to justice. This is problematic. It makes God appear as a caliph. The teachers of predestination cast God in the image of their rulers. This was to pacify the masses and make them less prone to rebellion. It did not work. The assaults on reason began with assaults on freedom. Contrary to the teaching of revelation, unreason became a key part of the faith. The traditionists belittled and rejected reason in favor of tradition. To be a Muslim, people were expected to refrain from using reason, especially in religion. But the attainment of knowledge requires the utilization of reason. Mystics also did not appreciate reason. They prepared the way for saint-worship. Theologians steeped in traditions rejected reason to follow tradition. The rejection of reason enabled the treatment of tradition as "revelation" and in that way corrupted the knowledge of revelation. Mysticism teaches that revelation is “beyond reason.” Mysticism undermined rationalism in Islam and paved the way for the fall of the Muslim Empire. For it is not possible to succeed without following revelation. And it is not possible to follow revelation without understanding revelation. Neither is it possible to understand revelation without the use of reason. Countless Muslims recite revelation without comprehending it. The unwillingness to use reason to know revelation blocked access to the knowledge of revelation. Tainted knowledge of revelation facilitated the turn to tradition. However, traditions could not guide as well as revelation. Those that followed traditions began to fall into error. The empire fell due to the errors of its rulers. These comprised the killing of the Mongol traders and ambassadors by the Abbasids. This triggered the annihilation of the Abbasids. Errors also included the twin assaults on Vienna, which ended in defeat and the fall of the Turkish empire. The reorientation from revelation to tradition was justified by the assertion that the predecessors possessed “better” knowledge of revelation. Being around the prophet was taken as evidence of better knowledge of revelation. But not everyone around the prophet embraced or understood revelation and its teaching. Traditionists are prophet-oriented; the rationalists are Allah-oriented. Traditionists follow traditions; rationalists follow revelation. After a time, tensions emerged between the rationalists and the traditionists. These tensions took on political expressions. They culminated in the slaughter of 5,000 philosophers in 786, by Musa al-Hadi, during the Age of Tradition. This foreshadowed the Reign of Terror by Maximilien Robespierre in 1792, during the French Revolution, the so-called Age of Reason in Europe, by a millennium. Following tradition in preference to revelation amounted to a turning away from revelation to tradition. After the passing of the prophet, following traditions was associated with following the prophet. This signalled the rise of tradition.
"It has been said that Muslims are finding it difficult to “fit in.” One reason for this is that they follow tradition rather than revelation. Traditions change but principles do not. They designated tradition as revelation and even deem the prophetic traditions “equal” to revelation, even though revelation teaches that Allah has no “equals.” Problems facing Muslims encompass acts by wayward persons. These are due in part to a poor of knowledge of Islam. This is partly a result of a problematic rendering of revelation. Problematic rendering is a result of problematic exegesis. Problematic exegesis results from problematic assumptions in exegesis. The problem with the assumptions is that they have no basis in revelation. In a few cases, they defy the teaching of revelation. The problematic rendering of Islam was propelled by the effort to “bend” the teaching of revelation to endorse feudal regimes that emerged after the stewardship of the righteous caliphs. Problematic assumptions in exegesis caused exegetes to arrive at perceptions that differ from what revelations teaches. The reliance upon these assumptions tainted the knowledge of revelation. (11 pages)
"Militant jihadism has roots in the past. Its present-day manifestation is a result of a long process of modification of the teaching of Islam. For jihad entails the struggle for betterment (ethical jihad) and fighting in self-defense (defensive jihad). Jihad in the ethical sense is a quest for excellence. But it appears that tribal proclivities affected the meaning of the term. The meaning of jihad was affected by the elevation of tradition to revelation, the abrogation of the peace verses of revelation, and by the fabrication of traditions that endorse an aggressive rendition of revelation. Jihadists present a threat to public safety. For in his own eyes, the jihadist is judge, jury and executioner. This requires an enormous ego. Responses require effective enforcement. A long-term response, however, requires addressing the education of Muslims. This applies not just to what Muslims are taught but the way they are taught. For the present approach is flawed. There is not enough emphasis on reflection. There is too much memorization. There is excessive unquestioning following. This is a relic of the past, the heritage of shutting the gates to reasoning, taqlid and anti-rationalism. Hence, there are calls for renewal. The way we reflect requires reform. For knowledge of revelation has been affected by a problematic methodology, unwarranted assumptions and by the application of flawed theories. An example of a problematic methodology is taqlid, blind following of tradition. An example of an unwarranted assumption is the perception that revelation features “ambiguous” verses. An example of a flawed teaching is the theory of abrogation. While Islam may not be in crisis, there is a crisis in Islam, in the Muslim mind. For Muslims became enchanted by tradition to the extent they are willing to follow it even when it defies reason, not to mention revelation. This requires reflection. It requires rethinking tradition and its relationship to revelation. Renewal in addition requires a rehabilitation of reason and the reform of Muslim education. (27 pages)
"Much has been written about the reconciliation of reason and revelation. It is also necessary, however, to reconcile tradition and revelation, especially where tradition veers from revelation and provides a foundation of religion. For it appears that tradition veered from revelation. This is unsurprising. It would hardly be the first time it happened. There is no reason to assume that we always act the way we should. There is no guarantee that the Is always follows and reflects the Ought, that there will always be a harmony between obligation and inclination. For humans are wont to follow their desires. Practice does not always reflect theory. It is assumed that there could not be difference between revelation and tradition. In fact, an examination reveals that there is as much tension between revelation and tradition as between reason and revelation, if not more so. The tension is evident in the discrepancies between tradition and revelation. The denigration of reasoning and the designation of reason as kufr, enabled these distortions to go unnoticed. How did the tension between tradition and revelation arise? For it appears that “traditional” exegesis features aberrations. These aberrations take the form of punishments in penal law without a foundation in, and even in defiance of revelation. These are the penalties for blasphemy, apostasy and adultery. These punishments also make Islam appear extreme. They provide believers with reasons to want to dissociate from a religion that is perceived as cruel and unreasonable. Blasphemy is not a punishable offence in revelation, yet tradition prescribes the death penalty. Apostasy is not punishable in this life according to revelation, yet tradition prescribes the death penalty. Adultery – after a verdict reached using the testimony of four reliable witnesses – is punishable by lashing, but tradition prescribes stoning to death. These punishments are based on departures from revelation. But revelation warns against judging by what God did not reveal. Evidently, the rulings of persons were permitted to “abrogate” the rulings of God. This is problematic, as it flouts a basic requirement of exegesis and jurisprudence, which is that revelation is the chief authority, which is to be followed, not overruled. The abrogation of revelation by tradition flouts the sovereignty of Allah. What is required is a re-affirmation of the superiority of revelation in relation to tradition. This should assist in the rehabilitation of the penal code and the elimination of aberrant rulings caused by the abrogation of revelation by tradition. This should bring penal law into agreement with the teaching of revelation and address the perception that Islam is bent on punishing rather than dispensing reconciliation and mercy. (28 pages)
The relationship between reason and revelation has received attention. By contrast, the relationship between revelation and tradition has not received much attention. Tradition emerges from revelation. The prophetic traditions emerged well after the prophet. They were recorded and transmitted by persons who were not prophets. They are records of the acts of the prophet relayed by persons. The reports are paraphrases and not verbatim words of the prophet. As traditions are not the exact words of the prophet but rather paraphrases by transmitters, we could well wonder in what way any tradition could be considered “authentic.” Yet traditions were treated as binding legislation because they were treated as revelation. Revelation precedes tradition. It inaugurates tradition. It appears, however, that the relationship between tradition and revelation took on an unfamiliar expression. It appears that tradition “eclipsed” or “veiled” revelation. The eclipse of revelation by tradition is reflected in the perception that “tradition judges revelation.” It is also reflected in the axiom that “revelation needs tradition more than tradition needs revelation.” These expressions reflect a reversal of the relationship between tradition and revelation. An eclipse analogously transpires whenever tradition abrogates revelation. For tradition to abrogate revelation presupposes that tradition is capable of superseding revelation. The relationship between revelation and tradition requires attention. This is suggested by the perception that revelation and tradition are “equal” expressed in the perception that “tradition is a part of revelation.” Renewal requires resetting the relationship of revelation and tradition. It requires restoring revelation to its pre-eminence in relation to tradition. Tradition is better perceived as the actualization of revelation in practice rather than as its “judge” or “abrogator.” Renewal also requires the rehabilitation of reason. This requires the restoration of reason to its rank as the faculty of knowledge. For neither revelation nor tradition may be understood without recourse to, and utilization of reason. The disparagement of reasoning was a result of flawed reasoning, which assumed that attaining faith requires the sacrifice of reason upon the altar of tradition. The denigration of reason is reinforced by a “hadith that reportedly goes to the prophet, according to which he forbade the use of ‘reason-based tafsir’ as a form of disbelief (kufr).” (10 pages)
God-consciousness grows from knowledge of revelation. Attaining knowledge of revelation, however, requires recourse to reason. Retaining knowledge of revelation requires establishing and retaining a balance between revelation and reason. The balance between revelation and reason was established differently in different parts of the world. As a result, access to revelation takes place in different ways in different parts of the world. The result of a less than perfect integration of reason and revelation was the corruption of knowledge. The corruption of knowledge in turn brought a partial separation of people from the Creator. East and West became estranged from revelation, each in its way. In the East, access to the knowledge of revelation was hampered by the repression of reason. As a result, revelation was subordinated to tradition. The repression of reason allowed folklore to taint the knowledge of revelation. It also enabled the emergence of problematic rulings. In the West, access to revelation was restricted by the emergence of empiricism, which teaches that “seeing is believing.” Accepting exclusively empirically verifiable phenomena as real reduces access to spirituality. At the root of the corruption of the knowledge of revelation is the perception that reason and revelation are “adversaries” rather than allies. This perception facilitated the repression of reason in the East and the marginalisation of faith in the West. The result was the marginalisation of religion and confusion. This upset the relationship between reason and revelation. Balance is important. Western persons applaud themselves on the rationality of their civilization. But is it really as rational as they would like us to believe? We witnessed wars and suffering in the recent past on an unprecedented scale. Are these conflagrations reflections of rational human beings? Are these the acts of rational persons? The West is far from being as “rational” as a few persons would have us believe. These aberrations were in part the result of a misunderstanding of the relationship between reason and revelation and the requirement to reach and retain a proper relationship between the two. Reason is required to understand the teaching of revelation. Reason is also required for the implementation of the teaching of revelation, properly understood. Unfortunately, it appears that the balance between reason and revelation was disturbed and requires restoration. How do we restore the balance? In finance, we restore the balance by raising income. In psychology, we restore the balance by raising awareness. In politics, we reach a balance of power. But how to restore spiritual balance? How do we redress the experience of alienation, separation from the relatives and from God? He established the balance, and we would be wise to respect it. In this work we explore the ways in which Islam and West resolved the alleged “tension” between reason and revelation. They both missed the mark, albeit in different ways. The West placed too much emphasis on reason while traditional Islam places too much emphasis on tradition, understood as revelation. To achieve a balance, the West has to become more spiritual while traditional Muslims should be rational.
The renewal of the Muslim civilization requires a renewal of the knowledge of revelation of Islam. For all knowledge is attained within a particular paradigm, on the basis of particular assumptions. These are not always explicitly stated. The assumptions will affect what emerges as “knowledge.” Traditional exegesis features a few pillars. Prominent among them is the assumption that the utilization of reason in the exegesis of revelation is kufr. That revelation features “unclear” verses is an additional assumption in exegesis. Yet revelation says it is “clear.” In their perception that revelation is “unclear” exegetes denied a part of the teaching of revelation. (11 pages)
"People are at times unable to tell the difference between authentic and perfunctory religion. They become mechanical, trapped in “false consciousness.” They think they are on the right path, but there are problems. A teacher in a talk I attended declared that we are “just like machines.” I was shocked. According to him, and he has a following, everything has been predetermined. We have no free will. I cannot even say I wrote something. “If you say I wrote this,” he boldly declared, “you [are saying that you] are God.” I was surprised by this “reasoning.” It seemed to be no reasoning at all. It seemed to betray a “breakdown of reasoning,” a deep civilizational crisis, “a crisis in the mind.” I felt it was designed to make me and everyone else present feel “small and insignificant.” This is how far fatalism has taken hold of the Muslim. Religion has become a tool to repress persons, to force them to surrender to the powers that be. It has become an instrument of tyranny. It resulted in an erosion of its authenticity and in Islam becoming perfunctory. We cannot force people to become good Muslims. The use of force is reflected in the requirement that apostates have to be killed. This conflicts with the declaration that “there is no compulsion in religion.” In a manifest defiance of the teaching of revelation, it forces people to remain Muslims under the threat of death rather than from genuine commitment. The forceful approach produces perfunctory Muslims. It produces perfunctory, mechanical and static religion, emptied of dynamism and wisdom. (6 pages)
"The Qur’anic Worldview: A Springboard for Cultural Reform is an additional effort by AbdulHamid AbuSulayman, a well-respected revivalist of Islam, to “renew” the Muslim civilization. His honesty, as always, is striking in its intensity. His analysis is distinguished by its tenacity. A reader will not get wearied but should expect to be challenged. AbuSulayman aims to get at the roots of the problem. The analysis argues that Muslims must retrieve the Quranic worldview, which he equates with the Islamic worldview. This essay explores his analysis from a Quranic perspective, and argues that, despite steps in the right path, additional work is required on the road to recovery, to revitalize Islamic spirituality. What is required, specifically, is to retrieve the knowledge of the Quran, which was “veiled” by a problematic method of the elucidation of the Quran, which aims to “explain” allegedly “ambiguous” passages by recourse to tradition and the theory of abrogation. A few prefatory remarks and analysis are followed by relevant parts from the book. (31 pages)
2018
This paper is concerned with the Qurʾānic methodology of Al-waḥda al-bināʾiyya li-l-Qurʾān/ the Qur’an’s Structural Unity and its impact in the arena of religious sciences and beyond. I provide a concise overview of the classical and contemporary debates concerning the genealogy of this method, including examples and a brief analysis of the works of a number of modern scholars who have contributed to the development of this methodology. Approaching the Qurʾān as a unitary structure, as a consistent hermeneutic, contributes to our understanding of critical issues not only in the Qurʾān and Sunna, but also in other religious disciplines, such as Islamic law. More importantly, I argue that this method provides an important hermeneutic resolution to critical debates surrounding Islam's moral and ethical framework. I conclude by stressing that Al-waḥda al-bināʾiyya li-l-Qurʾān is essential for enhancing religious scholarship in general and for advancing the spheres where Islamic knowledge is applied.
2014, The Muslim World Journal
You can find the article at: www.interscience.wiley.com
"In what follows, an abridged version of AbdulHamid AbuSulayman’s well-known classic, The Crisis in the Muslim Mind is prefaced by preliminary remarks. The English translation of 1993 was an abridged version of the Arabic version, published in 1991. It appears that AbuSulayman agrees that there is a crisis. The broader disagreement is about where the crisis is. According to AbuSulayman, the crisis is in the Muslim mind. Thus, reform is required. But this is a reform of thought, a reform of methodology. (20 pages)
"All bona fide religion was wholesome when it began. However, accretions begin to seep in and taint its teaching. Hence, periodic renewal is required. Also, it is necessary to beware of misinterpretations. These typically take place for political or economic reasons. Misrepresentations appeared in the form of “traditionist” Islam, based on tradition more than revelation. Misrepresentations also appeared in the form of “political Islam,” resulting from the alleged abrogation of the peace verses by the ayah as-sayf. When the knowledge of their teachings was corrupted, the former religions faded. In Islam, revelation could be unchanged; but this does mean that the knowledge of revelation has remained unchanged? There are reasons to believe that the knowledge of revelation underwent a transformation. This transformation was caused by problematic assumptions, the utilization of the theory of abrogation and the replacement of parts of revelation by traditions. It appears that a measure of corruption of the knowledge of revelation took place. Extreme renditions of revelation and tradition provide palpable examples of the corruption of knowledge. This requires attention; alternatively, the fate that befell the previous generations could also be the fate of the present-day generation. (7 pages)
2003, Source Methodology in Islamic Jurisprudence (The Usul of Islamic Fiqh)
Usul Al-Fiqh is a science which is deeply embedded in the Islamic experience and one which, thanks to its methods and concerns, helped generate an empirical trend in Muslim culture, in turn benefiting western thinking. Itself a creation of influences from within and without, Al-Usul, often called “The Philosophy of Islam,” invites both reason and revelation to work for the harmony and well-being of human society. Although the science of Al-Usul is mainly concerned with legal matters, its range and the arsenal of tools it uses makes it attractive to students of Islamic Jurisprudence as well as to other scholars of Islamic Knowledge and culture. The difficulties it poses are inevitable. This book, however, attempts to simplify this “Most important method of research ever devised by Islamic thought” during its most creative period, and bring it to the understanding and appreciation of the modern learner, while underscoring its importance and relevance to the world of Islam today.
Too many works have been written on the theological discourses revolving around particular Shari’ah injunctions allegedly clashing with human rights norms and particularly with the universal and absolute human rights provision of freedom of thought, conscience and religion. However, little attention has been given to general ethos of the Qur’an regarding this issue. Two particular concepts will be of interest in this work: Firstly, we will examine the theory of naskh (abrogation). We will then continue with a humble attempt to take a balanced approach and nuanced position in understanding naskh. We will argue in favour of its existence, investigate its rationales and benefits and come up with a compromise redefinition and reconceptualisation of naskh. It will then be asked how the revelatory contexts of the two verses (ayat al-sayf and ayat al-qital) that have been claimed to have abrogated dozens of verses on peaceful coexistence, relate to naskh. Secondly, we will conclude with a few thoughts on the objectives (Maqāṣid) of Shari’ah.
hanafi school of thought
An introduction to the Doctrine of Ikhtilaf al-Fuqaha, difference of opinion among Muslim jurists, defines the doctrine as a basic principle of ISLAMIC LAW, lists major texts, traces development of the doctrine, and its history as social construction of Islamic law.
2011, Apostasy in Islam: A Historical and Scriptural Analysis
What is the legally prescribed penalty, if any, for apostasy (al-riddah), and how does this relate to the demand for religious tolerance as stipulated in verse 2:256 of the Qur’an “There shall be no compulsion in matters of faith”? It is an established fact that the Prophet never, in his entire life, put an apostate to death. Yet, the issue remains one of the most controversial to have afflicted the Muslim world down the centuries. It is also the source of much damaging media coverage today as Islamic jurisprudence stands accused of a flagrant disregard for human rights and freedom of expression. The subject of this book is a highly sensitive and important one. The author rightly concentrates on evidence, to examine the historical origins of the debate in rigorous detail, as well as the many moral and contextual issues surrounding it. Disputing arguments put forward by proponents of the death penalty he contends that both the Qur’an and the Sunnah promote freedom of belief including the act of exiting the Faith and do not support capital punishment for the sin of al-riddah. Note that attention is on the word sin, for there is qualification: as long as one’s apostasy has not been accompanied by anything else that would be deemed a criminal act, particularly in terms of national security, then according to the author, it remains a matter strictly between God and the individual. Of interest is the fact that the Qur’an significantly refers to individuals repeatedly returning to unbelief after having believed, but does not mention that they should be killed or punished. This work has been written at a time of great complexity and vulnerability when a true understanding of the higher intents and values of the Qur’an and the Sunnah, maqasid al-shariah, is sorely needed. The author employs a strong evidence-based approach examining in detail the Qur’an and authentic Hadith, taking into consideration traditional approaches to the study of the Islamic textual sciences and other fields of knowledge, as well as analyzing scholastic interpretation. Taking the life of a person without just cause is according to the Qur’an equivalent to the killing of the whole of mankind. It is vital therefore, that in the interests of compassion and justice, as well as freedom of belief, this subject is clearly addressed once and for all.
2004, Department of Fiqh and Usul
Essentially this article attempts to reveal the reformists` point of view regarding the concept of taqlid. Taqlid itself had been regarded by most scholars as the main cause for the degeneration of the Muslim intellectual tradition. Therefore, in the reformists` point of view, any attempt to remove such negative attitude must be scheduled through the academic and intellectual means. For the specification purpose, the discussion is divided into two main issues pertaining to the concept of taqlid, such as; definition and basic theoretical foundation of Islamic reformism, the reformist's criticism toward the concept of taqlid and the summary and conclusion of study.
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs,Volume 32, Issue 1, 2012,pages 88-107,DOI:10.1080/13602004.2012.665624
“Fiqh al-Aqalliyyat”—the jurisprudence of Muslim minorities—is a legal doctrine introduced in the 1990s by Taha Jabir Al-Alwani and Yusuf Al-Qaradawi which asserts that Muslim minorities, especially those residing in the West, deserve a special new legal discipline to address their unique religious needs that differ from those of Muslims residing in Islamic countries. Developed as a means of assisting Muslim minorities in the West, it deals with problems Muslims face in countries where they are minorities and focuses more on devising exceptional rulings pertaining to their unique circumstances. In light of this, this paper attempts to assess this doctrine—its purpose and its methodology—with emphasis on the legal Islamic tools of ijtihad and maslaha whilst also shedding light on its limitations. It argues that while attempts are being made by scholars and writers to make it a successful tool for jurisprudence, it will take a few more years to assess whether “fiqh al-aqalliyyat” is effective in getting more members of Muslim minority societies to follow shari'ah such that it becomes a politically uniting force for Muslim communities in non-Muslim societies and most importantly, if it is effective in establishing an Islamic method that supports the peaceful coexistence of Muslims and non-Muslims within non-Muslim societies. for full text , visit, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13602004.2012.665624
Al-Waraqat is a classical text on Usul al-Fiqh (principles of Islamic Jurisprudence) and is a useful book to understand basic elements of this field. It begins with deconstructing the components of Usul Al- Fiqh as a branch of knowledge and then explain each part separately. Commentary at hand has been prepared while referring to explanations from a number of renowned scholars and jurists. Book is available through creative common licence free of cost. May Allah accept this effort. Muhammad Nabeel Musharraf, Australian Islamic Library www.AustralianIslamicLibrary.org
This manual aims to provide an introduction to the Sources of Islamic law and jurisprudence with a view to its teaching as a free-standing one term course at undergraduate or postgraduate level or as part of a course on Islamic law such as Islamic family Law, Islamic international law and Islamic criminal justice.
In Islamic legislation Ijtihad plays an important role and has central position in the whole process. Demands of life change day by day thus it become necessary to take on the structural review of Islamic laws keeping in mind the spirit and discipline of Islamic. Ijtihad thus play as a perfect tool for legislation. Regarding fatawas the jurists followed the methodologies of companions, tabieen, and taba Tabaeen. In cases in which they did not find any legal opinion of their teachers related to a specific problem they themselves tried to find out the solution for that problem from the relevant Texts and formulate their own fatawa. In Pakistan the Judiciary that performs the task of interpretation for law-making, Majlis-e-Shura and various Ulama are exercising the job of Ifta. The Council of Islamic Ideology is the official legislative body of fatawa. Taqleed is also an acceptable mode of legislation whose proofs are evident from Quran and Sunnah. It has been used as a source of legislation in Pakistan as well. In constitution of Pakistan article 189 and 201 are related to Taqlid. Article 189 and 201 makes the decisions of Supreme Court binding on all courts and the High court judgments binding on all subordinate courts. Thus the legislative process in Islam employs the methods of Ijtihad, Ifta and Taqlid as a perfect tool of legislation. Keywords: Islamic Legislation, Ijtihad, Ifta, Taqleed
2016, Ilahiyat Studies
Ibn Surayj, a prominent figure in the formative period of the Shāfiʿī law school, has played an important role in both the transformation of Shāfiʿī substantive law and the development of early Islamic legal theory. Ibn Surayj reportedly wrote approximately four hundred works, few of which are extant today. Thanks to his contribution to the school, he is known as " the second al-Shāfiʿī (al-Shāfiʿī al-ṣaghīr); " indeed, according to some modern scholars, Ibn Surayj is the true founder of the Shāfiʿī school and Islamic legal theory. Although Ibn Surayj's works on Islamic law are no longer available, the later chapters of al-Wadāʾiʿ li-manṣūṣ al-sharāʾiʿ, one of his two extant works, bear the following titles: abrogation (naskh), prophetic traditions (sunan), single-transmitter report (khabar al-wāḥid) , c o n s e n s u s (ijmāʿ), analogy (qiyās), and knowledge (ʿilm). This study presents the edition and translation of relevant titles in al-Wadāʾiʿ to provide Ibn Surayj's views on uṣūl. In addition, this paper discusses Ibn Surayj's place in the evolution of Islamic legal theory, and how Ibn Surayj interprets al-Shāfiʿī's understanding of uṣūl.
"Taha Jabir Alwani is the former Chairman of the International Institute of Islamic Thought, based in Herndon, Virginia, USA. In this essay he analyzes the causes and effects of taqlid, and its deleterious effects on the Muslim mind. He appears to be in agreement with AbdulHamid AbuSulayman, that there is a crisis. His frank approach is refreshing, compared to the culture of denial that has become entrenched among some Muslims. He identifies the root of the crisis as consisting in the abandonment of ijtihad and the emergence of taqlid. The way to recovery, according to him, is a revival of the Islamic science of ijtihad. Al Ghazali attempted a revival of the Islamic sciences. However, somehow the revival of ijtihad was not among them. Hence Muslims fell behind. A few of the issues with this article have to do with willingness to look at tradition from a critical perspective. The author remains very orthodox in several ways. He does not address the thorny question of the authenticity of traditions or the problematic theory of abrogation. He does not sufficiently highlight that the problem is the corruption of knowledge, resulting from the marginalization of reason. Another issue is the rendition of hikmah as the sunnah of the prophet. Actually, the term hikmah means wisdom. He does not question whether tradition is revelation and does not see the treatment of tradition as revelation as presenting a threat to the teaching of tawhid. He does not mention problematic traditions. He does not see significant differences between tradition and revelation; to him they are conflated. He does not bring to the readers’ attention that the prophet himself prohibited the recording of his statements. Alwani remains trapped by the tradition that he seeks to revive. He is like a person who wants to have a spring cleaning or housecleaning but is not willing to jettison antiquated furniture that has become cherished to his heart. So, he remains in the midst of the antiquities that confine him and are causing problems for him. (11 pages)
2010, Towards A Fiqh for Minorities: Some Basic Reflections
Towards a Fiqh for Minorities is an important subject and a much needed contribution to an area of fiqh that has become essential for the wellbeing and development of Muslim communities living in the West. The author stresses that the problems of Muslim minorities can only be tackled with a fresh juristic vision based on the principles, objectives and higher values of the Qur’an in conjunction with the ultimate aims and intents (maqasid) of the Shariah. In essence Dr. Al-Alwani’s paper is a call for Muslim minorities to have a sense of themselves as citizens and develop a positive, confident view of their place and value in society, moving away from notions of immigrant status and governed by a humanistic vision focusing on the betterment of society.
2018, Kardan Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities
Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations is the first book in the Islamization of Knowledge series initiated by the US-based International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT). The Institute undertakes and promotes research focused on reconciling traditional Islam with the modern world and its realities. The book mentioned above was originally submitted to the University of Pennsylvania as a doctoral dissertation. IIIT first published it in 1987 as The Islamic Theory of International Relations1. They however published it again under the new title in 1993 after a series of editing and subsequent modifications. This paper presents a review of the mentioned book.
2020, Fine Differences: The Al-Alwani Muslim-Christian Lectures 2010-2017
Reaffirming our joint spiritual journey to God, and spiritual responsibility towards humanity is the burden we all share and the antidote to bigotry, prejudice, and all those ideologies that betray mankind’s sense of compassion and justice. Wholeness – despite our persisting fine differences – for society and for persons is the theme of this Muslim-Christian dialogue sustained for six years in Washington, D.C. The power of faith is the power to unite and the recognition of commonalities through the medium of communication is one path to achieve this, and one element of Iraqi legal scholar Taha Jabir al-Alwani’s greater vision. In 2007 a conversation began between John W. Crossin, a priest of the Order of St. Francis de Sales seeking to open the door of the forty-year-old Washington Theological Consortium – heretofore all-Christian – and Ahmed Alwani, son of Taha Jabir al-Alwani. The younger Alwani was seeking an institutional partner for his father’s project of relating Islamic scholarship to Western social sciences. • Must religious emotions and ideas fuel social conflict? • Who pays the cost of mediating conflict? • What is the right way to value human labor? • Who and what is meant by the Qur’an’s reference to the “People of the Book” ? Addressing these divisive issues, Muslim and Christian thinkers in pairs dig down toward their respective ultimate convictions. Occasionally the pair concurs. Always they elucidate their fine differences.
2017, Reviving the Balance: The Authority of the Qur’an and the Status of the Sunnah
This work studies the position of the Sunnah in Islam and its fundamental relationship to the Qur’an. The author carefully examines the sensitive issue of the development of the oral and written traditions, the problems scholars faced despite painstaking work verifying the authenticity of reports, the character of narrators, etc. and the ever-growing complexity of a body of narratives that were making the simplicity and clarity of the Prophet’s life, words, and actions, a burgeoning maze of information. Taking the praiseworthy intention and effort to emulate the Prophet into account, the author nevertheless makes the case that once the Sunnah had been collected, the Muslim community began to neglect the Qur’an in favor of narrations of what the Prophet had done and said on the pretext that such narratives “contained” the Qur’an. Eventually they then abandoned the Sunnah narratives in favor of Islamic jurisprudence on the pretext that Islamic juristic texts tacitly included both the Qur’an and the Sunnah. It is with the aim of restoring the relationship between the two that this work has been written, that is, the Prophetic Sunnah must be tied inextricably to the Qur’an in a way that allows for no contradiction or conflict between the two, to avoid misapplication and abuse of hadith, and to meet the requirements and challenges of a new age.
"Taqlid was a factor in the waning of Islam. It was the wrong approach to use. For taqlid requires indiscriminate following. It requires faith in the work of jurists. With the use of taqlid, jurists became followers of their predecessors rather than followers of revelation. In focusing on the exegeses of revelation rather than revelation, jurists distanced themselves from revelation and followed non-revealed texts. They turned from the foundational text of the faith to derivative, secondary texts. In this way, their knowledge became second-hand. The estrangement of jurists from revelation, entailed in by-passing the founding text, restricted the prospects for renewal. For renewal requires re-engaging with the knowledge that brought faith into existence in the first place. The elevation of tradition to the rank of revelation and the subordination of reason to tradition, rearranged the ranking of the roots of the law. It appears, accordingly, that the re-invigoration of the faith requires redressing taqlid, the rehabilitation of exegesis and the restoration of reason to its rightful rank as a faculty of recognition. For taqlid and anti-rationalism are but different aspects of a process whereby reason makes way for tradition for the purpose of understanding of revelation. But does tradition understand revelation better than reason? (14 pages)
2005, Issues in Contemporary Islamic Thought
This collection of papers presents a reformist project calling upon Muslim intellectuals and scholars everywhere to comprehend the vast breadth and depth of the crisis engulfing Muslim thought today and the necessity of solving this crisis to enable the Ummah to experience a revival and fulfill its role among the nations of the world. The reader will find a variety of articles dealing with this intellectual crises, these include a chapter on ijtihad’s role and history, important since our intellectual problems cannot be solved without the scholars’ use of independent reasoning and creativity. Another discusses imitation (taqlid) calling upon Muslim scholars and intellectuals to abandon imitation and to stop favoring the past over the present when trying to solve modern problems. Another looks at human rights.
On February 3, 2015 a video emerged online showing the young Jordanian airforce pilot Muath Al-Kasasbeh being burnt to death by “Islamic State of Iraq and Shām” affiliates (ISIS or IS). Another IS live burning video was released on December 22, 2016, this time of two Turkish prisoners of war. IS quoted the Syrian theologian Ibn Taymiyya in support of the licitness of the publicized burning alive of war captives as revenge and intimidation. The same argument was developed in prior and concurrent pro-IS literature and fatwas online and in print. This book shows that such an argument, fatwas, and act are in fact unislamic and have no basis whatsoever in the Qur’ān, the authentic Sunna and acts of the Companions, or Islamic law in its totality, and that the burning of enemy captives, whether for retaliation, deterrence, or any other reason, is forbidden by consensus in the rulings pertaining to the conduct of war.
2018, Walisongo: Jurnal Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan
Nowadays, Muslims are facing various contemporary problems related to the discourse of fiqh or Islamic law. In this case, the old tradition of Islamic jurisprudence is no longer sufficient to answer those problems due to the changes in the context of space, time, culture, and contemporary sciences. Any effort to renew the aspect of methodology must be done in the field of uṣul al-fiqh not only in Islamic jurisprudence. This is the reason that methodological reconstruction is needed in order to make it is able to accommodate the various problems that are disturbing Muslims today. One of Muslim scholars who tried to reconstruct at the level of the methodology of maqāṣid al-shariah is Jasser Auda. For the purpose of reconstructing maqāṣid al-shariah fundamentally, Auda uses a philosophical approach that is multidisciplinary as well as open with various other relevant disciplines as a methodological framework for reforming the study of uṣul al-fiqh and Islamic law. Applying philosophical and historical approach this study found that Auda reconstructs maqāṣid al-shariah by offering six features: cognitive nature, wholeness, openness, interrelated hierarchy, multidimensionality, and purposefulness. Furthermore, Auda gives contribution to the development of Islamic law and human rights. This paper will explore reconstruction as well as the contribution of maqāṣid al-shariah promoted by Auda through the approach of the philosophy of the system.
"The papers presented in this book were written between 2010 and 2016. The primary themes of the papers on education focus on student-centred learning, as well as on widening the breadth of research. The emphasis in the papers on finance is on the benefits of risk sharing as an alternative to risk transfer. The papers on Islamic finance highlight several problems within the discipline, for example the tendency to replicate rather than innovate, which is the tendency to structure Islamic financial contracts in ways that will make them resemble bonds, i.e. with both "profit" and capital guarantees, where "dividends" are determined in advance, and as a proportion of the capital "invested" rather than of the profit earned. The presence of such guarantees effectively transforms profit into interest, as neither profit nor capital is guaranteed in a truly Islamic transaction. The party providing the capital has to share risk: this is what makes the investment Islamic. Another problem is the absence of true sales in the contracts. Islamic law does not recognize these sales as valid, as legal ownership of the asset remains with the seller even after he or she "sold" it. This fake sale comes from from English common law and results in an equally fake ownership, known as "beneficial ownership." Islamic finance requires sharing risk to become truly Islamic. (127 pages)