18th-century German philosophy

Buscando fontes para o estudo da relação histórica entre Kant e as ciências da natureza, analisaremos a relevância inicial do debate entre duas figuras importantes na filosofia e nas ciências do século XVIII sobre ele: J.-J. d'O. de Mairan e Madame du Châtelet. Tratando de um aspecto da tese geral do primeiro escrito de Kant, Pensamentos sobre a verdadeira estimação das forças vivas (1747) e da forma como incidiram neste, em seguida discutiremos o debate entre eles acerca das forças vivas, localizando-os conceitual e historicamente nesta disputa. Com isso, pretendemos mostrar que Kant estava ensaiando aqui uma primeira versão de um movimento que se tornaria característico seu, basilar para a elaboração da filosofia crítica.

Seeking sources for the study of the historical relationship between Kant and the natural sciences, we will examine the initial relevance for him of the debate between two important figures in eighteenth-century philosophy and sciences: J.-J. d’O. de Mairan and Madame du Châtelet. Dealing with an aspect of the general thesis of Kant’s first writing, Thoughts on the true estimation of living forces (1747) and the way those authors impacted on it, we will then discuss the debate between them about the living forces, locating them conceptually and historically in this dispute. In this way, we intend to show that Kant was rehearsing here a first version of a movement that would become characteristic of him, fundamental to the elaboration of critical philosophy.

In this chapter, Robb Dunphy is concerned with the nature of G.E. Schulze's scepticism as he presents it in his 1792 work Aenesidemus, and with its relation to the metaphysical projects of Kant, Reinhold, and later German Idealists. After introducing Schulze's text, Dunphy turns to a recent interpretation offered by Jessica Berry, who claims that the extent to which Schulze endorsed a genuinely Pyrrhonian Scepticism has gone unacknowledged, both by his idealist contemporaries and by the majority of the secondary literature on the period. Berry suggests that this unacknowledged Pyrrhonism in Aenesidemus provides the resources for a more radical criticism of the German Idealists' scientific, systematic metaphysical ambitions, to which they remain fundamentally vulnerable. Despite agreeing that an exploration of Schulze's debt to Pyrrhonism represents a valuable addition to our understanding of his scepticism, in the latter parts of the chapter Dunphy suggests that the Berry's attribution of a Pyrrhonian Scepticism to Schulze should to some extent be rejected, and that such a scepticism is perhaps not quite as problematic for the projects of Kant and the German Idealists as she suggests.

This volume is dedicated to questions about the nature and method of metaphysics in Classical German Philosophy. Its chapters offer original investigations into the metaphysical projects of many of the major figures in German philosophy between Wolff and Hegel.

The period of Classical German Philosophy was an extraordinarily rich one in the history of philosophy, especially for metaphysics. It includes some of the highest achievements of early modern rationalism, Kant’s critical revolution, and the various significant works of German Idealism that followed in Kant’s wake. The contributions to this volume critically examine certain common themes among metaphysical projects across this period, for example, the demand that metaphysics amount to a science, that it should be presented in the form of a system, or that it should proceed by means of demonstration from certain key first principles. This volume also includes material on influential criticisms of metaphysical projects of this kind.

Metaphysics as a Science in Classical German Philosophy is a useful resource for contemporary metaphysicians and historians of philosophy interested in engaging with the history of the methodology and epistemology of metaphysics.

La presente these articule les deux categories fondamentales de la philosophie de la religion : le « moi » et le « divin », ce en dialogue avec deux interlocuteurs privilegies, Fichte et Nabert, chez lesquels cette double thematique fut exploitee de maniere originale et geniale. Fichte pense le « moi » comme le centre de l'interiorite et de la vie consciente de l'homme qui est une activite incessante vers l'unite de soi. Nabert, quant a lui, part du concept fichtien du « moi » pour elaborer la categorie du « divin » ; celui-ci apparait alors comme une demande de la conscience en sa structure fondamentale : elle le recoit alors qu'il s'affirme a meme le« moi». L'examen conjoint de de ces deux pensees apporte, nous cherchons a le montrer, une contribution majeure a la philosophie de la religion contemporaine : elle permet en effet a celle-ci d'avancer dans les reponses aux nombreux defis qu'il lui appartient de relever, soit : la redecouverte de certain...

Hölderlin-Friedrich Schiller und ich: "Und die Lieb auch, öffnet fleißig die Augen. Das Bleibende aber stiften die Dichter." (Hölderlin) Ja: ich will aus der Kohle aussteigen: aber nicht aus dem Atom: der Mensch kann nicht aus dem Atom aussteigen!  Der Mensch kann aus der Natur nicht aussteigen!  Der Mensch kann nicht aus der Kohle-im engeren Sinne-aussteigen! Denn sowohl das Atom als auch die Kohle sind im Menschen: weil sie im Kosmos sind! Weil sie in der Natur sind, und weil der Mensch in der Natur ist. Und der Mensch braucht auch nicht aus sich oder aus der Natur auszusteigen! Denn der Mensch ist immer ein Teil des Atoms, und immer ein Teil der Natur und immer ein Teil der Kohle und immer ein Teil des Universums. Wir bekommen weder das Atom noch die Kohle noch das Öl los von uns: denn wir sind immer mitten darin! Wir müssen nur immer daraus uns heraus-arbeiten: so aber entstehet der Mensch. Die Arbeit macht den Menschen, macht den Geist. P. s. unter "Liebe" hat Schiller ebenso wie Hölderlin und Platon, wie Karl Marx, Spinoza und ich immer den kosmischen Eros verstanden, der alles schafft. Und Hölderlin meinte wie Schiller, Platon und wie alle Aufklärer, auch wie Lessing und Heine, immer, daß der Mensch dann, wenn er sich im Geiste erfaßt, er sich auch wirklich, also auch real erfaßt! Daß der Mensch also sich dann, wenn er sich geistig erfaßt, er sich auch real erfaßt. In der Arbeit, in der Ökonomie, in der Wissenschaft und in der Philosophie.  Auch Sokrates, der "trockene Held", meinte auch dies. Ein Un-Dogmatischer.

In dieser Untersuchung befasse ich mich mit Kants These in seinem Nachlasswerk, dass das Moralgesetz zugleich als das Gottesgebot zu betrachten ist, sowie deren Überzeugungskraft in Kants philosophischem System. Vom scholastischen Gottesbegriff ausgehend definiert Kant im ersten Konvolut seines Nachlasswerks den Gott als ein allmächtiges, allwissendes und allgütiges Wesen. Es ist allerdings alles andere als offensichtlich, wie sein spekulatives Konzept Gottes innerhalb seines philosophischen Systems harmonisch zu positionieren ist, ohne dabei einen Konflikt mit den Hauptthesen der kantischen Philosophie zu verursachen. Durch die Analyse von Kants Darlegungen sowie deren Vergleich mit seinen früheren Aussagen in der kritischen Werkperiode schlage ich jedoch die Interpretationsthese vor, seine These als eine Fortführung seiner Postulatenlehre zu lesen, im Gegensatz zur derzeit vorherrschenden Deutung, dass Kant in seinen späteren Jahren auf seinen moraltheologischen Gottesbegriff verzichtete.

In this paper, I examine the extent to which the theoretical procedures for interpreting works of visual art, which Gotthold Ephraim Lessing describes in his famous book Laocoon: An Essay Upon the Limits of Painting and Poetry, are comparable to various methods of interpretation from the tradition of hermeneutics. To achieve this, I analyse how Robert S. Leventhal and Frederick Burwick approached Lessing's interpretation techniques and try to expand their views and apply them to Lessing's thoughts in Laocoon. I will focus on the idea that Lessing's procedures for interpreting works of visual art depend, to a certain extend, on his methods for analysing literature. Even though these authors did not link Lessing's thoughts to the hermeneutical theory of Friedrich Schleiermacher, I will also explore whether there are certain similarities in their views on the main constituents of the process of interpretation.

The ontogeny of the anthropology consists in returning to the history of the discipline, of its formation. It involves studying its institutional and intellectual development.The philosophical anthropology is an essential matrix of the current anthropology; its study allows us to understand the historic shape of intellectualization of the concepts and the work of definition which notably begins in the XVI century with Montaigne and in the XVIII century with Kant. As a consequence, the philosophy was the armature of the ontogeny of the anthropology and allowed to propose a universal frame of analysis on the world and men.

My aim in this article is to provide an account of practical judgement, for Kant, that situates it within his theory of judgement as a whole – particularly, with regards to the distinction between the determining and reflecting use of judgement. I argue that practical judgement is a kind of determining judgement, but also one in which reflecting judgement plays a significant role. More specifically, I claim that practical judgement arises from the cooperation of the reflecting power of judgement with the faculty of reason – the former assisting the latter in the application of its principle. I conclude by considering a possible role for feeling in practical judgement.

In this talk, we analyze some of the relationships that have been historically articulated
between feminisms and technologies. Specifically, the positions of cyberfeminisms and
technofeminisms. We are interested in recognizing some of the instrumentalist and political
assumptions about technology, where technology is understood as particular and discrete
objects that have a specific political use, namely, enslave or liberate.
We articulate a critique of these assumptions from an ontological view of technology,
which attends to the becoming of technical objects, recognizing in them their technological
potencies and what this implies for a political perspective, specifically feminist.

Correspondência trocada de Kant a Christian Gottfried Schütz.Trata da tematização de Mendelssohn sobre o aspecto dos conceitos puros aos quais não há correspondência na realidade, portanto, conceitos que não possuem realidade objetiva, mas que, por tratarem de conceitos que exprimem os interesses da pura razão, não requerem determinação. Assim, embora passem por ser "ilusórios" do ponto de vista cognitivo, do ponto de vista puro e reflexivo são inteiramente legítimos para o pensamento.

Abstract

In 1719 Jean-Baptiste Du Bos publishes his treatise Réflexions Critiques sur la Poésia et sur la Peinture, which Voltaire has called ‘the most useful book that has ever be written on the subject by any European nation’. In his book the author deals with the problem of artistic genius, a phenomenon that was in focus from late 17th century in many treatises on theory of art, especially in France and England. This article concentrates on the interpretation of this particular idea in the work of Du Bos, who tries to explain it through a wide range of empirical examples, using the latest achievements from different branches of science. His concept of ‘physiological genius’ and ‘climatic genius’ can be seen as unique. His reflections on sensation-based aesthetic experience and the new way of defining the relationship between the artist-genius and the dilettante art experiencer, influenced later 18th century authors who wrote about art theory and aesthetics (Lessing, Home, Herder, even Kant). Du Bos's idea of wider public engagement with art, and art appreciation, becomes relevant in the 18th and 19th centuries, so one can say that in many respects Du Bos's treatment is ahead of its time and that these ideas are also relevant in the contemporary context.

Nesse artigo tratamos da relação que Goethe, em seus escritos italianos, estabelece com o passado antigo sobrevivente em sua materialidade  – o que ele designa pelo termo “solo clássico”. A experiência de visitar um local mencionado por um autor da Antiguidade seria capaz de ativar, por meio da “imaginação”, a memória histórica, forjando uma relação “viva” com o passado. Por outro lado, ele também julga difícil adquirir uma ideia correta da Antiguidade através dos restos do mundo antigo, sentido em que a imaginação se torna um problema. Como resposta ele propõe uma disciplina do olhar sobre a paisagem.

Traducere de NICOLAE BAGDASAR şi ELENA MOISUC Ediţia a III-a îngrijită de ILIE PÂRVU EDITURA IRI Bucureşti, 1998 NOTĂ ASUPRA EDIŢIEI Prin ediţia de faţă ne propunem să redăm circuitului public traducerea Criticii raţiunii pure, realizată de Nicolae Bagdasar, în colaborare cu Elena Moisuc, după ediţia germană îngrijită de Raymund Schmidt, ediţia a II-a, Leipzig, 1930. Traducerea, apăruta în anul 1969 la Editura Ştiinţifică, era însoţită de un amplu aparat critic semnat de Nicolae Bagdasar (Studiu introductiv, Glosar kantian, Indice de nume proprii), pe care nu-1 reluăm în ediţia de faţă. Mulţumim pe această cale doamnei Elena Bagdasar, care a avut generozitatea să ne cedeze dreptul de a relua toate traducerile din opera lui Kant publicate de profesorul Nicolae Bagdasar, cunoscut exeget al scrierilor filosofului german. Cu prilejul reeditării acestei lucrări, în 1998, redacţia a corectat unele erori de tipar şi unele inconsecvenţe terminologice. Totodată, au fost indicate diferenţele dintre ediţia I şi ediţia a II-a a Criticii raţiunii pure, acolo unde lipseau în varianta iniţială, din 1969. Toate acestea au fost semnalate prin bunăvoinţa prof. dr. Ilie Pârvu, căruia editura îi aduce mulţumiri.

It is commonly held that Kant ventured to derive morality from freedom in Groundwork III. It is also believed that he reversed this strategy in the second Critique, attempting to derive freedom from morality instead. In this paper, I set out to challenge these familiar assumptions: Kant's argument in Groundwork III rests on a moral conception of the intelligible world, one that plays a similar role as the 'fact of reason' in the second Critique. Accordingly, I argue, there is no reversal in the proof-structure of Kant's two works.

Der vorliegende Aufsatz setzt sich mit der Problematik der Zauberflöte auseinander, deren Libretto im Hinblick auf Szenen und Situationen untersucht wird, in denen die Frage des menschlichen Gesichts aufgegriffen wird. Es geht in erster Linie darum, die auf die Physiognomik zurückgehenden Inspirationen im Textbuch der Oper zu ermitteln und den hier gehandhabten Umgang mit der Bildlichkeit des Gesichts unter Bezugnahme auf kulturwissenschaftliche Erkundungen dieses Themas zu analysieren, um daraus Anhaltspunkte für die Interpretation des gesamten Werkes zu gewinnen. Die so gewonnenen Erkenntnisse zeigen, dass das Gedankengut der Physiognomik in der dargestellten Welt der Oper durchaus rezipiert wurde, es war allerdings eine sehr kritische Rezeption. Der Gesichtsdiskurs in der Zauberflöte bestätigt, dass deren Botschaften weit über die Schwarzweißmalerei des auf den ersten Blick märchenhaften Konflikts zwischen Gut und Böse hinausgehen.

Gottfried Gabriel’s concise introductory book aims, in his own words in the preface, “to offer a clear and at the same time problem-oriented presentation of Kant’s philosophy with a view to the architectonics of the complete work” (p. 9). To this end, the book is divided into twenty-one short chapters, which offer an overall picture of Kant’s philosophy, ranging from the central themes of epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics to the more peripheral ones of his philosophy of religion and philosophy of history. Despite this comprehensiveness, Gabriel’s presentation revolves especially around the three critiques (Critique of Pure Reason [KrV],
Critique of Practical Reason [KpV], and Critique of the Power of Judgment [KdU]) and how
they integrate with each other. The large number of other Kantian works cited throughout the book – pre-critical or otherwise – are mainly, although not exclusively, mentioned in reference to the critiques and the system they encompass. Our purpose is to offer a descriptive analysis of the book, focusing on the main doctrines of Kant – we will thus omit many of the standard comments regarding the connection of Kant to the 19th and 20th centuries.

Das Ziel dieser Studie ist es, die Figur des Mephisto in Goethes Faust, die in der deutschen Literatur zuerst in den Sinn kommt, und die Figur des Mephisto, eine in der englischen Literatur enthaltene Comicfigur, mit der Figur in Mythologie und Theologie zu vergleichen. In den Abschnitten, die Sie unten sehen, wird dargestellt, dass der Charakter von Mephisto (oder mit anderen Worten Mephistopheles), der in der Mythologie und in Werken zu sehen ist, in vielen Aspekten wie seiner Leistung, seinem Machtbereich und seinen Eigenschaften untersucht wird. Gleichzeitig vor dem Vergleich, um den Zusammenhang besser zu verstehen; Autoren, Illustratoren und Charaktere werden kurz beschrieben.

O artigo pretende esboçar a resposta de Kant ao problema do comércio psicofísico em seu primeiro trabalho, Pensamentos sobre a verdadeira estimação das forças vivas (1747). Para isso, aborda-se primeiro o surgimento do problema em Descartes, depois as respostas canônicas que lhe foram oferecidas, nomeadamente, o ocasionalismo, a harmonia préestabelecida e o influxo físico, e, por fim, localiza-se Kant como defensor desta última, mostrando as peculiaridades e problemas de sua resposta.

Compte rendu de :

Nicholas Saul, Johannes Endres (éd.), "Ich liebe Deine Liebe. Der Briefwechsel zwischen Friedrich Schlegel und Friedrich von Hardenberg (Novalis). Eine Ausstellung zum 250. Geburtstag der beiden Dichter", Freies Deutsches Hochstift, Francfort, Göttinger Verlag der Kunst, 2022, 192 p. ISBN 978-3-945869-13-0

Walter Zimmermann (éd.), "Novalis ABC Buch. Das „Allgemeine Brouillon“. Materialen zur Enzyklopädistik", neu geordnet nach Novalis eigenen Klassifizierungen mit Zeichnungen von Nanne Meyer, Berlin, Matthes & Seitz Berlin, 2022, 312 p. ISBN 978- 3-7518-0366-3

Feder made many contributions to theoretical philosophy, but his main work is a contribution to practical philosophy. His Untersuchungen über den menschlichen Willen (Inquiries on the Human Will), which was published in four parts from 1779 to 1793, covers practical philosophy with an almost exhaustive breadth. He provides some insight into his motives for producing the Untersuchungen in the introduction to this work: It is an attempt to resolve some of the persisting disagreements in ethics. The disagreements he has in mind are those regarding the aims of human life, the reasons for the obligatoriness of moral and legal laws, and the moral quality of human nature. Although these disagreements have persisted since antiquity, Feder believes they can be resolved through an investigation of the will starting from the standpoint of observation. On his view, "self-knowledge is an exceedingly necessary science" for human beings, because empirical anthropology can help to answer these traditional questions posed in practical philosophy. This paper presents Feder's position, in light of debates in the period, on the foundation of morality, in which he holds that the question of the foundation of morality can be answered through improved empirical selfknowledge.